BROWN, J.
T.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s grant of a petition for modification of child custody filed by S.N. (“Father”) regarding their son, S.N. . . .
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Here, the trial court did not make a specific finding that visitation would endanger S.N.’s physical health or well-being or significantly impair S.N.’s emotional development. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with instructions to either: (1) enter an order containing findings sufficient to support a visitation restriction under Ind. Code § 31-14-14-1 based on the evidence already in the record; or (2) enter an order that does not contain a visitation restriction. See V.A.M.C. Rehearing, 773 N.E.2d at 360.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Father’s petition to modify custody of S.N., reverse the trial court’s restriction of Mother’s parenting time, and remand this case to the trial court to either enter an order containing sufficient findings to support a visitation restriction or enter an order that does not contain a visitation restriction.
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
MAY, J., concurs.
CRONE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
CRONE, J., dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to remand pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1(a) and Farrell, 790 N.E.2d 612. To reiterate, the statute states, “A noncustodial parent is entitled to reasonable parenting time rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time might: (1) endanger the child’s physical health and well-being; or (2) significantly impair the child’s emotional development.” Ind. Code § 31-14-14-1(a). The plain language of the statute requires the 14
trial court to enter findings only when it denies any parenting time to the noncustodial parent. That was the situation in Farrell, on which the majority relies. To the extent that Farrell may be interpreted as holding that findings are required if the trial court grants parenting time that deviates, no matter how slightly, from the Parenting Time Guidelines, I would respectfully disagree with that interpretation as contrary to both the letter and the spirit of Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1(a) and the Parenting Time Guidelines. See Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines, Preamble (“The purpose of these guidelines is to provide a model which may be adjusted depending upon the unique needs and circumstances of each family.”); id. at § 3 (“Where there is a significant geographical distance between the parents, scheduling parenting time is fact sensitive and requires consideration of many factors which include: employment schedules, the costs and time of travel, the financial situation of each parent, the frequency of the parenting time and others.”). To equate reasonable parenting time with the full panoply of visitation rights pursuant to the Parenting Time Guidelines and to allow a deviation therefrom only in situations where there is child endangerment would severely limit a trial court’s ability to fashion a visitation schedule that best suits the situation of the parents involved. Such a result would be ill advised.
Here, the trial court granted Mother “parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines with the exception that [Mother] shall have only one weekend of parenting time per month.” Appellant’s App. at 76. Because the trial court granted Mother parenting time, the court was not required to enter findings pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1, and thus Mother may not challenge its failure to enter such findings. Mother may challenge only whether her parenting time is reasonable. Based on the record before us, including evidence regarding the significant geographical distance between Mother and Father, I conclude that it is. Therefore, I respectfully dissent as to issue II and would affirm the trial court in all respects.