RILEY, J.
We begin by addressing the State’s contention that Lang’s appeal is untimely, and, therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. “A party initiates an appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the trial court clerk within thirty (30) days after the entry of a Final Judgment.” Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1). “Unless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as provided by P.C. R. 2.” App. R. 9(A)(5).
The State contends that the relevant date for timeliness is January 5, because the trial court orally rendered its sentencing order and order of restitution on that date.2 When responding to the motion to strike filed before the trial court, Lang contended that January 12 was the relevant date for consideration of timeliness because that was the date when the trial court’s written order was file stamped and entered as reflected in the Chronological Case Summary. In the alternative, Lang contended that the relevant date was January 9, 2009, the date on which the trial court reduced its order to writing and signed it. Lang explained that if her time to file a notice of appeal began on January 9, 2009, the due date would have been February 8, 2009, a Sunday, and, therefore, her notice of appeal would have been due on Monday, February 9, 2009.
In Smith v. Deem, 834 N.E.2d 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied, we reviewed case law regarding the date upon which the thirty day time limit to appeal began if there was a discrepancy between the date when the trial court rendered its order and when it was entered into the “record of judgments and order (RJO)” pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 58. We explained that a “notice-based approach . . . is the best solution.” Id. at 1109.
In cases where, for whatever reason, there is a delay between the trial court’s rendition of judgment and the entry into the RJO, as is the case here, several things can be said. First the judgment or order is effective as between the parties from the date it is rendered. In addition, the date of entry into the RJO is generally the date from which the appellate time limit begins to run. Indeed, upon entry, the parties are required to be given notice. But where, as here, a party does have notice of the trial court’s ruling before its entry into the RJO, we see no reason to justify allowing that party to delay filing a Notice of Appeal within thirty days of the date on which the party received notice simply because the clerk has not performed a ministerial task.
Id. at 1110.
We conclude that the rendition of the trial court’s Final Judgment occurred on January 9, 2009, when the trial court signed the sentencing and restitution orders, not when the trial court explained orally what its intentions were at the close of the sentencing hearing. Therefore, regardless of whether we interpret the January 5th oral statement by the trial court as notice, Lang had thirty days from January 9 to file her notice of appeal. As such, Lang had at least until Monday, February 9, 2009, to timely file her notice of appeal, which she did.
BAKER, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.