BRADFORD, J.
Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8 (enacted 2005) provides, in part, as follows:
The court may hold a new probation hearing at any time during a probationer’s probationary period:
(1) upon motion of the probation department or upon the court’s motion; and
(2) after giving notice to the probationer.
(c) At a probation hearing …, the court may modify the probationer’s conditions of probation. If the court modifies the probationer’s conditions of probation, the court shall:
(1) specify in the record the conditions of probation; and
(2) advise the probationer that if the probationer violates a condition of probation during the probationary period, a petition to revoke probation may be filed before the earlier of the following:
(A) One (1) year after the termination of probation.
(B) Forty-five (45) days after the state receives notice of the violation.
(d) The court may hold a new probation hearing under this section even if:
(1) the probationer has not violated the conditions of probation; or
(2) the probation department has not filed a petition to revoke probation.
Collins contends, however, that the case of Jones v. State, 789 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, controls, in which this court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it issued additional discretionary terms of probation in the absence of a probation violation. Id. at 1012. The State counters that Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8, which specifically provides for alteration of probation terms even in the absence of a violation, has superseded Jones. On this point, we agree with the State.
The simple fact is that section 35-38-2-1.8 was enacted some two years after Jones was handed down, and directly contradicts its holding. . . . Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8 clearly gives a trial court authority to revise the terms of probation regardless of whether a probation violation has occurred, superseding Jones on this point.[2]
We acknowledge that, in general, “the law in effect at the time that the crime was committed is controlling.” Holsclaw v. State, 270 Ind. 256, 261, 384 N.E.2d 1026, 1030 (1979). But an “exception to this rule exists for remedial statutes, which are statutes intended to cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute.” Martin v. State, 774 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ind. 2002). “When a remedial statute is involved, a court must construe it to ‘effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted[.]'” Id. (quoting Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 378, 14 N.E. 586, 589 (1887)) (alteration in Martin). “Accordingly, remedial statutes will be applied retroactively to carry out their legislative purpose unless to do so violates a vested right or constitutional guaranty.” Id.
Here, we conclude that Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8 is remedial in that it was intended to clarify that probation can be altered at any time, even in the absence of a probation violation. Since its enactment in 1983, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1(b) has provided, inter alia, that “[t]he court may … modify the conditions [of probation] at any time.” Prior to Jones, it seems to have been understood that this provision did, in fact, enable a trial court to alter the terms of probation at any time, even in the absence of a probation violation. See, e.g., Malone v. State, 571 N.E.2d 329, 330-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“However, this restriction is tempered by the power of the trial court to modify the conditions of probation at any time.” (citing Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1(b)(1))). In June of 2003, however, the Jones Court interpreted section 35-38-2-1(b) as limiting the ability of a trial court to alter the terms of probation to situations where a violation had been shown. Jones, 789 N.E.2d at 1012. 9
In November of 2004, the Indiana Sentencing Policy Study Committee adopted and issued a proposal for “[t]he modification of the statute to permit a Court to hold a new probation hearing and modify a probationer’s conditions of probation at any time during the probationary period.” Final Report of the Sentencing Policy Study Committee 17 (2004). The Committee also included a draft statute that was later enacted unaltered as Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8. . . . In 2005, the 114th General Assembly passed Senate Enrolled Act 101, which contained section 35-38-2-1.8, and it is clear that the bill was the product of the Study Committee’s proposals. See Ind. P.L. 14-2005 § 1; Digest of Senate Bill 101 (March 18, 2005) (available at http://www.state.in.us/legislative/bills/2005/PDF/ES/ ES0101.1.pdf). In view of this history, the legislature’s evident purpose in enacting section 35-38-2-1.8 was to supersede the holding in Jones, and we now give effect to that purpose.
BROWN, J., concurs.
CRONE, J., concurring in part [including this issue], and dissenting in part.
[2] Collins draws our attention to Ferrill v. State, 904 N.E.2d 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), in which another panel of this court applied Jones’s holding to conclude that the trial court was without authority to modify terms of probation absent a probation violation. Id. at 325. We observe, however, that the Jones Court did not mention, much less address the applicability of, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8, possibly because the State did not file an appellate brief. Id. at 324. Because Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8 clearly supersedes Jones, we decline to follow Ferrill.