VAIDIK, J.
Barber contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to continue she filed on the morning of her trial because it prevented her from fully presenting her defense of involuntary intoxication, thereby violating her due process rights. . . .
. . . .
Here, the trial court denied Barber’s motion to continue because it had set a hard deadline of December 1, 2008, for the witness list, and the court had “the inherent power to say this is the deadline for getting witnesses filed.” . . . “There is no question that trial courts have the discretion to exclude belatedly disclosed witnesses.” S.T. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 632, 635 (Ind. 2002). However, this discretion is limited to instances where there is evidence of bad faith on the part of counsel or a showing of substantial prejudice to the State. Id. Indeed, in light of a defendant’ right to compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution, there is a strong presumption in favor of allowing the testimony of even late-disclosed witnesses. Id. at 636. Where a party fails to timely disclose a witness, courts generally remedy the situation by providing a continuance rather than disallowing the testimony. Id.
In this case, there is no evidence that defense counsel acted in bad faith in asking for a continuance on the morning of Barber’s December 15, 2008, bench trial and filing her updated witness list that morning as well. Defense counsel had just located the witnesses that weekend and needed time to secure their presence for trial. Barber was arrested on October 15, 2008. Barber’s first continuance came only five days after her arrest and before her defense counsel had been appointed. Barber’s second continuance was filed on November 17, 2008, about one month after her arrest. It provided, “On the evening on November 14, 2008, an investigator located one of the many potential witnesses that would be essential to the Defendant’s case, however through that investigation, it has been learned that there may be several other witnesses left to be identified.” . . . As a result, defense counsel alleged that she could not provide an effective defense for Barber. The trial court granted the continuance and scheduled the trial for December 15, 2008. In the meantime, defense counsel and the Public Defender’s Agency Investigators continued to look for additional witnesses. On Saturday, December 13, 2008, two days before trial, defense counsel finally contacted two additional witnesses, Mathis and Collier, who could support Barber’s defense of involuntary intoxication. Accordingly, on the morning of trial, defense counsel filed a Verified Emergency Motion to Continue seeking a motion to continue the trial or, in the alternative, a motion to bifurcate the trial allowing the State to present its witnesses that day and giving the defense an opportunity to present its newfound witnesses on a later date.     Defense counsel then provided an offer of proof. The only prejudice the State alleged it would suffer was that had it known earlier, it could have called off its witnesses (two civilians and two officers), who showed up for trial that morning. However, defense counsel located Mathis and Collier over the weekend and filed the motion to continue on Monday morning, the day of the bench trial. As such, the State would not have known whether the trial was still on until the trial court ruled on the motion. The prejudice to the State is minimal.
Barber’s defense was involuntary intoxication. . . . There is obvious prejudice to Barber from not being able to present the testimony of Collier and Mathis. Although Barber testified that she believed she was drugged, Collier would have testified that she believed the same thing happened to her on the evening of October 15, 2008, at the same American Legion. And according to defense counsel, Mathis would have supported both Barber’s and Collier’s testimony. This is the bolstering testimony of disinterested and objective witnesses. . . . .
In light of Barber’s right to present a defense, the strong presumption in favor of allowing the testimony of even late-disclosed witnesses, the lack of substantial prejudice to the State, and the resultant prejudice to Barber, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Barber’s motion to continue and therefore remand for a new trial. [Footnote omitted.]
NAJM, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.