BAKER, C.J.
Appellant-petitioner Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) appeals the trial court’s order directing DCS to pay the fees of the attorney who was appointed to represent appellee-respondent S.G. (Mother). DCS argues that the trial court erred by ordering DCS to pay the attorney fees of Mother’s court appointed counsel. Finding that, notwithstanding a recent revision of the relevant statutes, the General Assembly did not intend for DCS to bear the burden of court appointed legal services in termination proceedings, and that the county should continue to be responsible for those costs, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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To determine whether DCS is required to pay for appointed counsel in termination proceedings, we must first consider whether court appointed counsel constitutes “services” within the meaning of the statute. Indiana Code section 31-40-1-1.5(c) defines the term “services” as follows:
As used in this chapter, “services” includes education, provision of necessary clothing and supplies, medical and dental care, counseling and remediation, or any other services or programs included in a dispositional decree or case plan ordered or approved by the juvenile court for the benefit of a delinquent child under IC 31-37.
We cannot conclude that court appointed legal services are analogous to the “services” mentioned in the above definition. Those “services” include programs and types of assistance traditionally offered and overseen by DCS, and it is easy to see the logic in the General Assembly’s decision to assign the cost of those services to DCS. Legal services, on the other hand, are not the types of services traditionally administered by DCS for children and parents. It is not evident, therefore, that the General Assembly intended that legal services be included in the above definition of “services.”
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It is evident . . . that as a general rule, the legislature prefers for the counties, rather than the State, to be responsible for the cost of legal services. Nothing contained within Indiana Code section 31-40-1-2 persuades us that the General Assembly intended to depart from that general rule in termination proceedings. Moreover, there is no line item or statute directing DCS to appropriate money for the purpose of covering the cost of legal services for parents involved in termination proceedings.
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended a radical overhaul of the way in which costs for legal services have always been allocated-and are allocated elsewhere in the Code-given that no explicit language to that effect has been included in the statute. As sagely observed by the N.S. court,
we recognize the distinct roles of each of our three branches of government and thus leave to the legislative branch the question of whether, in light of the trend toward State funding of child welfare costs, the costs associated with [guardians ad litem] and [court appointed special advocates] should be shifted to the State. Under our current statutory scheme, however, it is clear that the burden of paying for services rendered by [guardians ad litem] or [court appointed special advocates] should be attributed to and paid for by the county.
Slip op. p. 13. Likewise, we find that the current statutory scheme places the burden of paying for court appointed legal services in termination proceedings with the county, rather than DCS. Therefore, we reverse the order of the trial court directing DCS to pay for Mother’s attorney fees.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
MAY, J., concurs.
BARNES, J., dissents with opinion.
BARNES, J., dissenting.
I respectfully, but emphatically, dissent. As we recently recognized, “in 2008, the Indiana General Assembly enacted House Enrolled Act 1001 (“HEA 1001”), which in part sought to raise the level of the quality of services provided in CHINS, termination of parental rights (“TPR”), and delinquency cases by shifting the funding burden from local government to the State in exchange for more influence by DCS in recommending services.” In re N.S., No. 32A05-0902-JV-78, slip op. 2 (Ind. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (referring to P.L. 146-2008); see also In re J.C., No. 32A01-0902-JV-97 (Ind. Ct. App. July 22, 2009). The majority believes that counties should bear the costs when counsel is appointed by the trial court to represent parents in termination proceedings. I, however, believe the paradigm in these sorts of cases has shifted dramatically with the enactment of HEA 1001. If we, as a State and a society, truly believe in the best interests of children and that the proper and appropriate care for them is a priority, we must then, in my opinion, assure that before they are taken from their families, these statutes are strictly followed and the DCS is put to its proof.
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. . . Because I consider the appointment of counsel in termination proceedings to be child services, the DCS is responsible for payment and, therefore, Indiana Code Section 31-40-1-2(h) does not apply here.
The DCS, not the county, determines when to initiate a termination proceeding. The DCS authors treatment plans, exacts requirements from parents as to basic skills, and provides all sorts of psychological and educational resources for parents. Because the DCS decides when to seek a termination, it should bear the cost of defending that decision. To heap the cost of these actions on the coffers of already cash-strapped counties is, in my mind, courting a legal and practical disaster. Thus, I conclude that Indiana Code Section 31-40-1-2 requires the DCS, not counties, to pay for the appointment of counsel in a termination proceeding.