BAKER, C.J.
Kimbrough next argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him. Specifically, Kimbrough argues that the trial court erred in imposing fines and court costs and in ordering him to reimburse the Public Defender Fund in the amount of $500 because no indigency hearing was held regarding his ability to pay those amounts. Kimbrough also challenges the amount of restitution that he was ordered to pay on the grounds of fundamental error.
. . . .
In this case, the record shows that Kimbrough posted a surety bond in the amount of $10,000 through the Lexington National Insurance Corporation (Lexington National) and remained free on that bond throughout the pendency of this case. His bond was not revoked until the jury returned a guilty verdict. . . . When the trial court appointed a public defender for Kimbrough at the initial hearing, it explicitly “reserved the right to order defendant to reimburse Elkhart County for services of Public Defender.” . . . .
Notwithstanding these circumstances, Kimbrough maintains that the reimbursement amount ordered by the trial court should not have exceeded $100 in light of our decision in Turner v. State, 755 N.E.2d 194, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). In Turner, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay a $1,000 public defender reimbursement fee. On appeal, Turner argued that such a reimbursement fee “exceeded statutory limits.” . . . .
In concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Turner to reimburse the public defender in the amount of $1000, we considered the provisions of Indiana Code § 35-33-7-6(c):
If the court finds that the person is able to pay part of the cost of representation by the assigned counsel, the court shall order the person to pay the following:
(1) For a felony action, a fee of one hundred dollars ($100).
In accordance with this statute, and in rejecting the applicability of Indiana Code § 35-33-8-3.2, which authorizes a trial court to deduct additional money to cover the cost of a public defender from a bond that is posted, we specifically observed that “Turner posted no bond and was incarcerated following his arrest through the conclusion of his trial.” 755 N.E.2d at 200. Moreover, we noted that
[W]hile Indiana Code Sections 33-9-11.5-6[1] and 33-19-2-3[2] grant trial courts the discretion to impose representations costs against a defendant in excess of one $100, those statutes do not apply in this instance. Indiana Code Section 33-9-11.5-6 applies only in those situations where “the court makes a finding of ability to pay the costs of representation,” while Indiana Code Section 33-19-2-3 applies only to those defendants that the court deems “not indigent.” Here, the trial court found defendant indigent for the purposes of appointing a public defender and then renewed its indigency finding when it appointed pauper appellate counsel. The trial court never declared Turner “not indigent” or otherwise determined that he had the ability to pay the cost of representation. The only statutory means at the trial court’s disposal for imposing costs on Turner was therefore Indiana Code Section 35-33-7-6(c), which caps such costs for a felony at $100. Thus, the trial court exceeded its statutory authority when it assessed Turner a reimbursement fee of more than $100.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thereafter, we had the occasion to examine the provisions of Indiana Code section 33-37-2-3 in Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, where the defendant argued that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order him to reimburse the public defender in the amount of $200 as a condition of probation.
Indiana Code section 33-37-2-3 states that
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), when the court imposes costs, it shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the convicted person is indigent. . . .
(b) A court may impose costs and suspend payment of all or part of the costs until the convicted person has completed all or part of the sentence. If the court suspends payment of the costs, the court shall conduct a hearing at the time the costs are due to determine whether the convicted person is indigent. . . .
. . .
(e) If, after a hearing under subsection (a) or (b), the court determines that a convicted person is able to pay part of the costs of representation, the court shall order the person to pay an amount of not more than the cost of the defense services rendered on behalf of the person. . . .
In concluding that the trial court did not err in imposing the $200 reimbursement fee, we observed that
[T]he trial court’s order requires that Rich reimburse the Public Defender as a condition of probation, which will not begin until after he has completed the executed portion of his sentence. Therefore, under section 33-37-2-3(b), the trial court was not required to hold a hearing until Rich has completed the executed portion of his sentence. As Rich is not required to pay the public defender’s fee at this time, holding a hearing to determine his current ability to pay was not required. Cf. Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind.2002) (recognizing that “a defendant’s financial resources are more appropriately determined not at the time of initial sentencing but at the conclusion of incarceration, thus allowing consideration of whether the defendant may have accumulated assets through inheritance or otherwise”). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Rich to reimburse the Public Defender.
Rich, 890 N.E.2d at 48 (emphasis added).
Like the circumstances in Rich, Kimbrough was not required to reimburse the Public Defender Fund until he has completed the executed portion of his sentence. . . . Hence, because the trial court did not order Kimbrough to pay that fee immediately, it was not necessary for the trial court to hold a hearing to determine his current ability to pay. [Footnote omitted.] Rich, 890 N.E.2d at 48; Whedon, 765 N.E.2d at 1279. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Kimbrough to reimburse the Public Defender Fund. [Footnote omitted.]
In addition to the trial court’s order regarding the payment of public defender fees, Kimbrough maintains that the sentencing order must be set aside because the trial court did not conduct an indigency hearing with regard to the payment of court costs and the $5000 fine that the trial court suspended.
Pursuant to our Supreme Court’s opinion in Whedon, we note that although a trial court may impose a fine or court costs on an indigent defendant, an indigent person cannot be imprisoned for failing to pay that fine or costs. 765 N.E.2d at 1279. Again, as were the circumstances in Rich, Kimbrough was not required to pay the fines and court costs immediately upon conviction. Moreover, even though the trial court ordered Kimbrough to pay a $5000 fine, it suspended it. Hence, only if the trial court rescinds the suspension at a later date and Kimbrough is imprisoned for failing to pay the fine, will this claim become ripe for adjudication. Cf. Gustman v. State, 660 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that an indigent defendant’s challenge to a probation condition that he pay child support was not ripe because the defendant was not yet being imprisoned for violating that condition).
The trial court also gave Kimbrough until January 16, 2017, to pay the court costs. In light of that determination, the trial court afforded Kimbrough nearly eight years in which to pay those costs, and he will be incarcerated for no more than seven years. [Footnote omitted.] As a result, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it did not hold a hearing to determine Kimbrough’s ability to pay those court costs. See Whedon, 765 N.E.2d at 1279 (recognizing that a defendant’s financial resources are more appropriately determined not at the time of initial sentencing but at the conclusion of incarceration, thus allowing consideration of whether the defendant may have accumulated assets through inheritance or otherwise).
. . . [W]hile a civil judgment does not bar the entry of a restitution order, a victim is entitled to only one recovery. Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3; Haltom v. State, 832 N.E.2d 969, 971-72 (Ind. 2005). Thus, if a defendant has already paid all or part of a civil judgment, the amount of restitution must be offset by the amount already recovered. Myers, 848 N.E.2d at 1110-11.
In this case, the trial court informed Kimbrough that there was an active body attachment for him in Elkhart Superior Court. Moreover, the court clerk indicated that there was a $350 civil judgment against Kimbrough and that Peoples was the holder of that judgment. The trial court also informed Kimbrough that the trial judge in the civil matter would not withdraw the body attachment without Peoples’s consent.
. . . .
As discussed above, Kimbrough was ordered to pay a total of $1,084 in restitution to Peoples. More specifically, the trial court ordered Kimbrough to pay $590 in emergency room bills, $75 in physician fees, and $419 for his broken glasses. . . . And, as noted above, Peoples held a judgment against Kimbrough in the amount of $350 in a civil case.
In light of these circumstances, we choose to remand this matter with instructions that the trial court clarify its restitution order. If it is determined that the amount of restitution that the trial court ordered Kimbrough to pay is duplicative of that contained in the civil judgment, the restitution order should be adjusted accordingly.
In conclusion, with the exception of our determination that the restitution order must be considered on remand, Kimbrough’s challenges to the trial court’s sentencing order fails.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
[1] This statute has been repealed and is now codified at Indiana Code section 33-40-3-6.
[2] This statute has been repealed and is now codified at Indiana Code section 33-37-2-3.