RILEY, J.
Elrod raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the small claims court abused its discretion when it denied Elrod the opportunity to present evidence on Brooks’ counterclaim.
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Elrod brought a complaint against Brooks and Brooks filed a counterclaim against Elrod. Brooks’ counterclaim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence, i.e., the purported sale of the two trailers, that was the subject matter of Elrod’s complaint. See Ind. Trial Rule 13(A). In this light, Indiana Trial Rule 42(A) states that
[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
During trial, the presentation of evidence is typically governed by Indiana Trial Rule 43(D) which provides that
The trial shall proceed in the following order, unless the court within its discretion, otherwise directs: First, the party upon whom rests the burden of the issues may briefly state his case and the evidence by which he expects to sustain it. Second, the adverse party may then briefly state his defense and the evidence he expects to offer in support of it. Third, the party on whom rests the burden of the issues must first produce his evidence thereon; the adverse party will then produce his evidence which may then be rebutted.
Although we acknowledge that Small Claims Rule 8(A) indicates that the court is not bound by the Rules of Trial Procedure, our supreme court nevertheless stated in Bowman v. Kitchel, 644 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ind. 1995), that “the Rules of Trial Procedure apply in small claims court unless the particular rule in question is inconsistent with something in the small claims rules.” Having reviewed the Small Claims Rules, we did not discover any specific rules that would preclude the application of Indiana Trial Rules 42(A) and 43(D).
In the instant case, the small claims court clearly ordered a joint hearing of both Elrod’s complaint and Brooks’ counterclaim. While Elrod carried the burden of presenting evidence on his complaint, Brooks carried a similar burden with respect to his counterclaim. Thus, after producing the evidence which sustains the claim-be it the original complaint or a counterclaim-the adverse party may produce evidence contesting this claim.
Recognizing the great amount of discretion a small claims court has in the orderly conduct of the proceedings before it, we are nevertheless troubled by the court’s outright refusal to give Elrod an opportunity to introduce evidence in an attempt to refute Brooks’ counterclaim. Even if it was the small claims court’s intention that Elrod should have presented all his evidence which supported his claim and contested Brooks’ counterclaim at the same time, the court never shared this intent with the parties. Regardless, it would still be dubious for Elrod to have to defend against a claim before hearing the evidence in support of it. Although informality is the key in small claims proceedings, it should not come at the cost of fundamental rights of the parties. Therefore, we conclude that the small claims court abused its discretion by denying Elrod’s right to present evidence contesting Brooks’ counterclaim.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the small claims court abused its discretion when the court denied Elrod the opportunity to present evidence on Brooks’ counterclaim.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
KIRSCH, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.