BARTEAU, S.J.
Defendants/Counterclaimants-Appellants Payday Today, Inc. (“Payday”) and Edward R. Hall (“Hall”) (collectively, “the defendants”) appeal from the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings and the grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Maria L. Hamilton (“Hamilton”). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
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Payday is a payday loan company, and Hall is its attorney. In July of 2004, Payday loaned $125.00 to Hamilton, a “small loan” as defined by Ind. Code § 24-4.5-7-104(a). Under the terms of the loan agreement, Hamilton was to pay $143.75, including the $125.00 principal and an $18.75 service charge, within two weeks from the date of the loan. As security for the loan, Hamilton provided Payday with a post-dated check for $143.75. When Hamilton’s check was returned to Payday, Hall mailed her a letter demanding the amount of the check, coupled with a $20.00 returned check fee and $300.00 in attorney fees. The letter stated that payment of these amounts was necessary for Hamilton to avoid a lawsuit.
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Payday contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether its claim for attorney fees violated the SLA. Payday notes that Ind. Code § 24-4.5-7-410(d) prohibits only “contracting for or collecting attorney fees” on small loans, and it argues that the letter did neither. Payday also states that it was allowed to ask for attorney fees under Ind. Code § 35-43-5-8.
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. . . [W]e cannot agree with Payday’s claim that the dunning letter is not an attempt to contract for or collect attorney fees on Hamilton’s small loan. The dunning letter is a clear violation of Ind. Code § 24-4.5-7-410(d).
With regard to Ind. Code § 35-43-5-8, which covers fraud on financial institutions, we note that Payday’s claim for attorney fees is delineated in a separate paragraph from its claim for fraud. Accordingly, the prohibited attorney fee claim is not a part of an Ind. Code § 35-48-5-8 claim.
Payday contends that it cannot be held responsible for the prohibited contents of the dunning letter because the letter originated from Hall’s office. Specifically, it contends that it “did not commit or cause to be committed any violation of the [SLA]. [Hall’s] office drafted the dunning letter and sent the letter on behalf of [Payday] as procedure of Hall’s office, not that of [Payday’s] office.” (Appellant’s Brief at 18). Therefore, Payday argues that it did not violate the SLA.
With regard to this contention, we first note that Indiana Trial Rule 56(H) bars reversal of summary judgment on the ground of an issue of material fact that was not designated to the trial court. See Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1081 (Ind. 2008). Payday designated nothing that creates an issue of material fact on this matter; indeed, it is undisputed that Payday hired Hall as its attorney in this collection case and that Hall sent the letter in question as a special agent on behalf of Payday for this limited purpose. It strains credulity to suggest that additional evidence must be submitted by Hamilton to prove that Payday “caused” this violation of the SLA, especially given its claim that identical letters are routinely used by payday lenders. It is clear that Payday caused the violation to occur.
Payday also contends that the trial court erred in finding and entering judgment on four separate violations of the SLA. Both in her complaint and in her motion for summary judgment, Hamilton was seeking damages of $2,000 for a single violation of the statute. We agree with Payday that the trial court may not rewrite Hamilton’s complaint and summary judgment motion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand with instructions that the trial court enter judgment for the $2,000 requested by Hamilton.
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The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from making false representations of the “amount…of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). The FDCPA further prohibits a debt collector from attempting to collect any amount that is not “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). . . .
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We note that when the dunning letter is inconsistent, contradictory, and akin to a literally false statement, the court may make a determination that the letter violates the FDCPA as a matter of law. See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, the dunning letter attempts to collect an amount not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. The letter unambiguously threatens litigation if attorney fees are not paid, and as we point out above, such a threat violates the prohibition against collecting or attempting to collect attorney fees found at Ind. Code § 24-4.5-7-409. This alone is sufficient to warrant the trial court’s conclusion.
In addition, as the trial court concludes, the dunning letter is misleading “in that it would lead a reasonable person (let alone an unsophisticated debtor) to conclude that [Hamilton was] legally obligated to pay attorney fees to satisfy her obligation to [Payday].” . . .
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We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part, with instructions that the trial court change its judgment to reflect our holding in Issue I. In order to avoid a “windfall” to Hamilton, we instruct the trial court to direct the attorney fee award to the Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic.
DARDEN, J., concurs in result.
FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.