SHARPNACK, S.J.
DOC required Moore to participate in SOMM [Sex Offender Management and Monitory Treatment Plan] as well as a Sex Offender Containment and Accountability Program (“SOCAP”). Moore was willing to participate in both programs; however, the programs required him to admit guilt and to subject himself to polygraph examinations. Moore was concerned about these requirements because he maintained his innocence throughout the proceedings, and his counsel was investigating and preparing a petition for post-conviction relief.
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Without addressing Moore’s Fifth Amendment claim, DOC determined that Moore was in violation of SOMM requirements, and it demoted Moore’s Credit Class I to Class III. It also ordered Moore “out of school,” effectively prohibiting him from completing his GED requirement and achieving the consonant sentence reduction. . . . .
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As DOC correctly notes, our supreme court has repeatedly held that Indiana courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to review prison disciplinary actions. See Blanck v. Indiana Department of Correction, 829 N.E.2d 505, 507 (Ind. 2005) and cases cited therein. Â . . . .
However, Indiana courts have held that other types of DOC actions may be reviewed by our courts. See e.g., Ratliff v. Cohen, 693 N.E.2d 530 (Ind. 2005) (holding that a juvenile may seek declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that her incarceration with adult offenders violated the Indiana Constitution); Kimrey v. Donahue, 861 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied (observing that a trial court has jurisdiction when an allegation is made that constitutional rights are being violated by DOC). The issue then is whether Moore raised only a challenge to the disciplinary actions resulting from his refusal to be subjected to a polygraph test and/or to admit to a crime he does not believe he committed or whether Moore’s challenge is rooted in the Fifth Amendment.
As disclosed in our statement of the facts above, Moore’s motion did indeed challenge the deprivation of credits and various privileges. However, his attorney previously challenged the deprivation of Moore’s Fifth Amendment right under DOC’s SOMM policies. Furthermore, in paragraph 7 of Moore’s motion, he challenged the violation of his right against self-incrimination by citation to Gilfillen. [Footnote omitted.]  Although his prayer addresses the restoration of credit time and privileges that were imposed as part of DOC’s discipline, it is apparent from his attorney’s letter and paragraph 7 of Moore’s that the gravamen of Moore’s claim is based on the constitutionality of certain requirements of its SOMM program. DOC cannot violate a prisoner’s constitutional right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, impose sanctions because the prisoner asserts his rights, and then hide behind the shibboleth of “no review of prison disciplinary matters.” We conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to review the deprivation of Moore’ credit time and privileges after such deprivation occurred pursuant to Moore’s claim of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
BAKER, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.