RUCKER, J.
On August 12, 2006, Detective Stephon Blackwell of the Madison County Police Department sought a warrant to search a home on Franklin Street in Anderson, Indiana, allegedly belonging to George Jackson. A hearing for such purpose was conducted before a regularly sitting trial judge of the Madison Superior Court. Detective Blackwell testified that over the previous couple of months he had become involved in an investigation which led him to request a warrant to search for marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine, and items used to sell, package, weigh or ingest the drugs, along with U.S. currency derived from the sale of cocaine or marijuana. He elaborated as follows:
Over the last couple of months, the Drug Task Force office has received several complaints from the public about heavy traffic to and from the residence. A confidential informant had advised myself and Drug Task Force that [Jackson] was selling cocaine, marijuana, and crack cocaine from this residence. The confidential informant that gave us this information has made several buys for the Drug Task Force that haven’t went to trial yet. As of last night, 8/11/06 around 10 p.m., the confidential informant saw a large amount of marijuana at that residence and I believe [Jackson] is currently out of prison on federal parole.
. . . Upon questioning by the State, the detective confirmed that no charges had been filed “yet” based on the past information the informant had given the Task Force. . . . Declaring that he “finds probable cause exists for the warrant requested” the trial judge issued the search warrant. . . . .
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Assuming without deciding that probable cause did not exist to support issuing a warrant to search Jackson’s home, we nonetheless conclude the trial court correctly overruled Jackson’s motion to exclude the evidence. The lack of probable cause does not automatically require the suppression of evidence obtained during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the United States Supreme Court determined that the exclusionary rule does not require the suppression of evidence obtained in reliance on a defective search warrant if the police relied on the warrant in objective good faith. Leon cautioned however that the good faith exception is not available in some situations, including where (1) the magistrate is “misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth,” or (2) the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. at 923 (citation omitted). The good faith exception to the warrant requirement has been codified by Indiana Code § 35-37-4-5.3. [Footnote omitted.]
. . . [T]he issue is joined over whether the second exception is applicable. Advancing an argument in the affirmative Jackson relies on Doss v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), for the proposition that Detective Blackwell’s testimony was “so bare bones and so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to make a reliance upon the resulting warrant objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 1049 (emphasis added).
We first observe that “[g]enerally, examples of “bare bones” affidavits include those that merely state that the affiant “has cause to suspect and does believe” or “[has] received reliable information from a credible person and [does] believe” that contraband is located on the premises.” United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2006) (footnotes omitted). [Footnote omitted.] Further, Doss is distinguishable. In that case the officer obtaining the warrant offered no information about a relationship with the informant other than his personal belief that the informant was truthful and credible. Doss, 649 N.E.2d at 1046. Also, the officer in Doss offered no evidence corroborating his claimed first-hand knowledge of the informant. Id. at 1049. In contrast, here Detective Blackwell demonstrated the nature of his relationship with the informant through evidence of the informant’s involvement in other controlled buys. Also, Detective Blackwell bolstered the informant’s tip by testifying to complaints from the public about traffic consistent with drug dealing.
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We acknowledge that Detective Blackwell’s testimony is abbreviated, and public complaints have their limitations. See, e.g., Pawloski v. State, 269 Ind. 350, 354-55, 380 N.E.2d 1230, 1232-33 (1978) (test for determining reliability of information varies based on whether the source is an anonymous tipster, a professional informant, or a cooperative citizen). But the heart of the matter is not whether a court of review agrees or disagrees about the existence of probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant; rather the issue is whether when viewed from a totality of the circumstances there was enough evidence before the issuing court that would allow the court to make that call. We are of the view the evidence in this case meets that standard.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.