BRADFORD, J.
In this consolidated appeal, Appellant-Petitioner the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) challenges the trial court’s orders that DCS pay the Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) fees associated with the underlying Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) proceedings. Specifically, DCS contends Indiana statutory authority dictates that the county, not DCS, is responsible for the payment of GAL fees. Concluding that Indiana Code sections 31-40-3-2 (2008) and 33-24-6-4 (2008) indicate that fees associated with services provided by the GALs are to be paid by the county, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
. . . .
DCS argues on appeal that Indiana Code section 31-40-3-2 clearly states that the GAL fees shall be paid by the county. We agree. 2 Indiana Code section 31-40-3-2, which relates to the payment of fees associated with services provided by GALs and CASAs, provides that:
The fiscal body of the county shall appropriate money from: (1) the guardian ad litem fund; or (2) the court appointed special advocate fund; to the juvenile courts of the county for use by the courts in providing guardian ad litem or court appointed special advocate services and the costs of representation for the guardians ad litem or court appointed special advocates.
Nothing in Indiana Code section 31-40-3-2 appears to contemplate the possibility that DCS should bear the burden of paying GAL or CASA fees. . . .
In addition, we note that the General Assembly did not amend Indiana Code section 31-40-3-2 to shift the burden of paying GAL and CASA fees to DCS when it adopted HEA 1001, which shifted the burden of the payment of other services from the county to DCS. The General Assembly could have shifted the burden of paying fees associated with the services provided by GALs and CASAs to DCS had it so intended, but its failure to do so suggests that the General Assembly intended for the burden to pay fees associated with services provided by GALs and CASAs to remain with the county.
. . . .
Further, to the extent that the Appellees argue that the applicability of Indiana Code section 31-40-3-2 hinges on evidence that a county has created a GAL or CASA fund and that here, no evidence has been presented suggesting that Hendricks County has created such a fund, we observe that Indiana Code section 31-40-3-2 does not contain any limiting language such as “if such fund exists” or “if the county decides to create such a fund.” Rather, Indiana Code section 31-40-3-2 states that “the fiscal body of the county shall appropriate money … to the juvenile courts … for use by the courts in providing [GAL] or [CASA] services.” (Emphasis added). We do not find this language to be contingent on the existence of a GAL or CASA fund, but rather an obligation by the county to provide funds to pay for services provided by GALs and CASAs. In addition, we observe that if we were to adopt the Appellees’ position, it would undoubtedly be detrimental to children statewide because counties could, in order to escape the burden of paying for these services, simply refuse to create a GAL or CASA fund, which, in turn, could eventually lead to a shortage of GALs or CASAs available to represent Indiana children in need of a GAL’s or CASA’s services.
The Appellees argue that to the extent that the county may be held liable for paying the fees arising from services provided by GALs or CASAs, Indiana Code section 33-24-6-4 indicates that the county is liable to pay these fees only if it has created a GAL or CASA fund. Thus, because DCS presented no evidence suggesting that such a fund exists in Hendricks County, the burden to pay GAL or CASA fees cannot be placed on the county. We disagree.
Indiana Code section 33-24-6-4 does not stand for the proposition suggested by the Appellees, but rather provides that the division of state court administration may establish an office of GAL and CASA services, which the General Assembly may appropriate funds to, as it sees fit. If the General Assembly chooses to appropriate funds to the GAL and CASA services office, the division of state court administration shall provide matching funds to counties that implement and administer a GAL or CASA program. Ind. Code § 33-24-6-4. The counties may then use these funds to supplement their GAL and CASA programs. Ind. Code § 33-24-6-4. Thus, the State’s duty to provide matching funds to Indiana counties to help supplement their GAL or CASA programs is contingent upon a decision by the General Assembly to fund the office of GAL and CASA services. We also find it instructive that Indiana Code section 33-24-6-4 provides for “matching funds” to help “supplement” the funds which are appropriated or collected by the county to finance services provided by GALs or CASAs. The General Assembly’s use of the terms “matching funds” and “supplement” suggests, in harmony with our interpretation of Indiana Code section 31-40-3-2, that the General Assembly intended for the onus of financial support for GAL and CASA programs to lie with the county, and not the State.
. . . .
Having concluded that Indiana Code section 31-40-3-2 clearly states that the fiscal body of the county shall appropriate money for use by the courts in providing GAL or CASA services, and that Indiana Code section 33-24-6-4 supports the proposition that the burden of financially supporting GAL and CASA programs lies with the county, we conclude that the trial court erred in ordering DCS to pay the fees associated with the services provided by the GALs in the instant matters. In addition, we recognize the distinct roles of each of our three branches of government and thus leave to the legislative branch the question of whether, in light of the trend toward State funding of child welfare costs, the costs associated with GALs and CASAs should be shifted to the State. Under our current statutory scheme, however, it is clear that the burden of paying for services rendered by GALs or CASAs should be attributed to and paid for by the county.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.
CRONE, J., and BROWN, J., concur.