MAY, J.
Gabino Gonzalez drove his pickup truck into a school bus while intoxicated. A jury found him guilty of criminal mischief and operating while intoxicated. Before his trial, while he was attempting to negotiate a guilty plea, Gonzalez wrote a letter to the school corporation in which he apologized for the accident and admitted he had been drinking that day. The trial court allowed the State to enter that letter into evidence. [Footnote omitted.] Gonzalez argues on appeal that was error because the letter was hearsay and because a letter written as part of guilty plea negotiations is inadmissible at a trial.
The letter should not have been admitted and the error was not harmless. We accordingly reverse and remand for a new trial. [Footnote omitted.]
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The trial court reset its original sentencing date to allow the school corporation time to decide whether to object to the plea agreement. Gonzalez sent a letter to the School expressing his condolences to all who were “involved in the terrible accident I caused,” apologizing for his “irresponsible actions” and “poor decision to drink that day,” and asking the School to show compassion to him and his family by “allowing the Court to be somewhat lenient” in sentencing him. . . . He promised to seek alcohol counseling and asked the School to consider that no one was injured in the accident. The trial court rejected the plea agreement and the case went to trial.
Before trial, the State asked that the letter be admitted into evidence. The trial court denied the request but reconsidered it during the trial. The letter was admitted over Gonzalez’s objection. The court dismissed the count of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content of .15 or more, and a jury found Gonzalez guilty of the remaining charges.
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Gonzalez’s letter was a privileged communication that should not have been admitted into evidence because it was written as part of the plea negotiation process. [Footnote omitted.] “A plea agreement, or a verbal or written communication concerning the plea agreement, may not be admitted into evidence at the trial of the case, should the plea agreement not culminate in approval by the court.” Ind. Code § 35-35-3-4 (emphasis supplied). Ind. Evidence Rule 410 also so provides:
Evidence of a plea of guilty or admission of the charge which was later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer so to plead to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing withdrawn pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal action, case or proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer.
(Emphasis supplied.) . . . .
Rule 410 provides no test for determining whether a statement was made “in connection with” a plea offer. Gilliam v. State, 650 N.E.2d 45, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), reh’g denied, trans. denied. To be privileged, the communication must have as its ultimate purpose the reduction of punishment or other favorable treatment from the State to the defendant. Id.
Gilliam contacted a police detective to try and negotiate a plea agreement. About half of their one-hour communication was devoted to the possibility of a plea agreement. The trial court suppressed statements Gilliam made during his attempt to reach a plea agreement, including statements about his criminal history, but admitted other statements he made in which he admitted participating in the crimes charged. We upheld the trial court: “It is apparent from our review of the record that the trial court determined Gilliam’s statements regarding his participation in the crimes charged were not made ‘in connection with’ his attempt to negotiate a plea and, thus, were admissible and relevant to the crimes charged.” 650 N.E.2d at 49.
Even if Gilliam’s admissions had been “in connection with” his attempt to negotiate a plea, we determined they would not be privileged because the statements were made to a police officer who had no authority to enter into a binding plea agreement. We noted the plea bargaining process does not start until persons having the authority to make a binding agreement have agreed to negotiate, so for a statement to be privileged it must be made to someone with authority to enter into a binding plea agreement. Id. Gilliam’s statement was merely a “unilateral offer of evidence to induce the State to negotiate” and thus was not privileged. Id.
Notwithstanding that dictum in Gilliam, we have not limited the privilege to statements made to persons with direct authority to enter into a binding plea agreement. In Stephens v. State, 588 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied, we held a statement made to the author of a pre-sentence investigation report was privileged even though the person to which it was made had no authority to enter into a plea agreement. The parties entered into a plea agreement and submitted it for approval. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence report. Stephens met with the author of the pre-sentence report, and the report recounted an admission by Stephens that he possessed and sold the subject cocaine. The trial court rejected the plea agreement. Stephens testified at his trial, and on cross-examination the State introduced the incriminating pre-sentence report statement to impeach him.
We noted the rationale for the privileged status of such communications is the belief plea agreements should be encouraged as an essential component of the criminal justice system. Id. at 565-66.
The policy favoring plea agreements convinces us that the legislature intends to include within the category of plea agreement communication any communication necessary to effectuate the plea agreement. Statements made during the course of a pre-sentence report interview fall within this penumbra. A pre-sentence report is required prior to the court accepting or rejecting a plea agreement whenever the plea agreement indicates “that the prosecuting attorney anticipates that the defendant intends to enter a plea of guilty to a felony charge.” IC 35-35-3-3(a) (1991 Supp.). In addition, IC 35-38-1-9(b)(1) (1991 Supp.) requires a pre-sentence investigator to gather information concerning the “circumstances attending the commission of the offense.” The subject statement is such a statement. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to allow the State to question Stephens about his self-incriminating statement.
Id. at 566.
Gonzalez’s letter to the School was akin to Stephens’ statement to the pre-sentence investigator, as it included “information concerning the ‘circumstances attending the commission of the offense,'” id., and it undoubtedly had “as its ultimate purpose the reduction of punishment or other favorable treatment from the State to the defendant.” Gilliam, 650 N.E.2d at 49. Gonzalez’s February 14 sentencing date was reset because the School expressed concerns about the plea agreement, and the trial judge wanted to give the School time to decide whether to object to the plea. Four days later, Gonzalez drafted the letter to the school board, asking it to support his plea agreement. The letter was made available to the probation department and made part of the pre-sentence report. The letter was part of the plea negotiating process and should not have been admitted.
BAILEY, J., and RILEY, J., concur.