BAKER, C.J.
As a probationer in a civil probation revocation proceeding, Mathews’s due process rights are no greater than that of a criminal defendant. Applying the stricter criminal standard, we must consider whether Mathews knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to be present at the September 18, 2006, fact-finding hearing. Our Supreme Court has stated that while failure to appear in court is not dispositive of a defendant’s intent to waive her right to be present, the trial court may examine the facts and determine that a knowing and voluntary waiver has occurred and proceed in absentia. Freeman 541 N.E.2d at 535. Our Supreme Court then noted that the best evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver is the presence of the defendant in court when the trial court scheduled the date of the hearing or trial. Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1273. Mathews was present in court on July 20, 2006, when the initial fact-finding hearing date was set for August 28, 2006. Although Mathews was not present when the motion to continue was filed on July 26, 2006, her attorney was there and knew that the hearing had been rescheduled for September 18. Moreover, Mathews did not appear in court on August 28, 2006. Had Mathews appeared on August 28, she would have been informed of the rescheduled fact-finding hearing, and, therefore, received notice to appear on September 18, 2006. Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not err in determining Mathews had knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to be present at the fact-finding hearing and proceeding in absentia. Thus, Mathews’s due process claim fails.
MAY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.