VAIDIK, J.
Sampson Boadi was charged with several counts of criminal recklessness, including reckless homicide, as a result of an automobile collision that occurred when Boadi, driving a semi tractor-trailer, failed to stop at a red light. At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief during Boadi’s jury trial, the trial court granted Boadi’s motion for a directed verdict on all counts on the ground that the recklessness element was not supported by sufficient evidence.
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We are persuaded that the failure to stop at a red light due to inadvertence or an error of judgment, without more, does not constitute recklessness as a matter of law. Although the failure to stop at a red light or stop sign is a violation of the traffic code, we cannot say that, without additional circumstances, the failure to stop at a light is a substantial departure from the acceptable standards of conduct sufficient to serve as evidence of recklessness. See Whitaker, 778 N.E.2d at 426 (“Some gross deviations from the traffic code, however, may under certain circumstances be such a substantial departure from acceptable standards of conduct that they will support a reckless homicide conviction, such as ignoring traffic signals at a high rate of speed[.]”) (emphasis added).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is no evidence of additional circumstances sufficient to satisfy the recklessness element of the charges against Boadi. Boadi did not accelerate toward the light; indeed, Boadi traveled through the intersection at a speed below the speed limit. There is no evidence that Boadi was driving erratically or under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There is no evidence that Boadi was fatigued or in any way failing to comply with trucking regulations. Boadi stopped immediately after the accident and did not flee. In sum, the evidence as a whole viewed in the light most favorable to the State shows that Boadi did not stop but instead proceeded through the intersection as the light turned green for the opposing traffic. Although this conduct might be evidence of inadvertence or an error in judgment, that is, negligence, such an error does not constitute criminal recklessness. Id. at 428. Additionally, our conclusion is consistent with Indiana?s public policy that “automobile accident deaths caused by negligence, even gross negligence, fall outside the realm of criminal prosecution[.]” Id.
The State urges us to find Boadi’s case similar to the scenario presented in Dylak v. State, 850 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The State is correct that there are similarities between the two cases: both semi-truck drivers were approaching a visible intersection, both had enough distance to stop before entering, and both failed to stop before the light turned red. However, Dylak had violated rules regarding how many hours a driver may drive during an eight-day period and how many hours a driver may drive at one time before resting for a minimum eight-hour period. Id. at 409. Dylak also admitted to officers responding to the scene of the collision that he was fatigued. Id. Dylak was convicted of reckless homicide, and this Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. However, there is no such evidence of fatigue or rule violations in Boadi?s case. We find Dylak distinguishable on this ground.
NAJAM, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.