RILEY, J.
Appellant-Respondent, Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund (the Fund), appeals the trial court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of Appellee-Petitioner, Gary Patrick (Patrick), Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Christopher Patrick, Deceased.
We affirm.
The Fund presents three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court erred when it granted Patrick an independent claim for damages for emotional distress in conjunction with his claim under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute.
Patrick is the natural father of Christopher Patrick (Christopher). At the time of his death, Christopher was thirty-one years old, had no dependent survivors, and lived with his father. . . .
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The Fund asserts that the trial court erred when it granted Patrick an independent claim for emotional distress damages in conjunction with his claim under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute. Because Patrick’s claim derives from the death of his son, the Fund maintains that his claim is more properly characterized as derivative rather than independent and as such, clearly falls within the damage limitations of the Adult Wrongful Death Statute. However, the Fund continues, whereas the Adult Wrongful Death Statute provides for recovery of actual pecuniary losses, the Statute does not include a provision for the recovery of damages for emotional distress. Therefore, the Fund concludes that Patrick is not entitled to damages. Conceding that emotional distress damages are not permitted under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute, Patrick asserts that Indiana courts have repeatedly recognized that an independent action for emotional distress may proceed in conjunction with a claim for wrongful death.
We find that much of the confusion in this area of law stems from the fact that damages for emotional distress are treated differently depending upon the vehicle with which they are instituted: whether they are brought in combination with the Wrongful Death Statute or as part of the Medical Malpractice Act.
No cause of action for wrongful death existed at common law. Chamberlain v. Walpole, 822 N.E.2d 959, 961 (Ind. 2005). An action for wrongful death is therefore purely statutory and is strictly construed. Durham v. U-Haul Int’l, 745 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. 2001), reh’g denied. The Wrongful Death Statute permits claims for wrongful death and authorizes suits by a personal representative of a decedent for death caused by the “wrongful act or omission of another.” I.C. § 34-23-1-1. If the decedent has no surviving “widow, widower, or dependent children, or dependent next of kin” the statute limits damages to “hospitalization or hospital service, medical and surgical services, such funeral expenses, and such costs and expenses of administration, including attorney fees.” I.C. § 34-23-1-1; Chamberlain, 822 N.E.2d 961. On the other hand, the Medical Malpractice Act governs claims for bodily injury or death of a patient as a result of “a tort or breach of contract based on health care or professional services that were provided, or that should have been provided, by a health care provider, to a patient.” I.C. § 34-18-2-18. The Act defines “patient” as “an individual who received or should have received health care from a health care provider . . . and includes a person having a claim of any kind, whether derivative or otherwise, as a result of alleged malpractice on the part of a health care provider.” I.C. § 34-18-2-22.
We recently explained the difference between a derivative claim and an independent claim for damages for emotional distress with regard to the respective Statutes in Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Winkle, 863 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We noted that a cause of action is derivative if it may be brought only where a separate, related claim is actionable. Id. at 6. The derivative claimant must prove all the elements of the related tort in order to recover. Id. A cause of action is independent if it may be brought irrespective of the merits of an accompanying tort. Id. . . .
Here, Patrick asserted that his emotional damages arose from the negligence of the medical personnel treating his son. His claim thus arises in the context of medical malpractice. Christopher was clearly a “patient” as defined by the Act. See I.C. § 34-18-2-22 (“Patient” means an individual who receives or should have received health care . . .”). Therefore, Christopher had a claim for medical malpractice as the actual victim of the malpractice. Patrick, being Christopher’s parent and having a “claim of any kind,” is also considered a “patient.” See id. (“‘Patient’ . . . includes a person having a claim of any kind, whether derivative or otherwise, as a result of the alleged malpractice. . .”). Having met the condition precedent for a cause of action for medical malpractice, the fact that Christopher subsequently died as a result of the malpractice and the claim had to be pursued under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute does not alter the existence or the nature of the claim. Thus, the trial court properly characterized Patrick’s claim for damages for emotional distress as independent of and in addition to the adult wrongful death claim.
Next, we need to turn our attention to whether Patrick’s claim satisfies the requirements necessary to assert his own independent claim for damages for emotional distress. . . .
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[H]ere, although Patrick was not present when the medical malpractice occurred-the health care provider’s failure to diagnose Christopher’s ruptured colon-he did deal with its aftermath. After Christopher was discharged from the hospital, Patrick took him home. That evening, Christopher called out to his father because he was vomiting blood. While Patrick was calling an ambulance, he saw Christopher throw up again, with blood coming out of his nose and mouth. Patrick went back and forth between his son’s bed and the street to look for the ambulance. When the EMTs finally arrived, Patrick immediately escorted them to Christopher’s room. Christopher’s eyes rolled back in his head as he fell back on the bed. The EMTs moved Christopher to the floor and attempted to resuscitate him. He never regained consciousness.
Based on these facts, it is clear that Patrick witnessed the death of a loved one, a death caused by the negligent conduct of health care providers. As a result, we find that the trial court properly concluded that Patrick, as a bystander pursuant to Groves, could bring an independent claim for the negligent infliction of his emotional distress upon Christopher’s death.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly granted Patrick an independent claim for damages for emotional distress in conjunction with his claim under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute.
Affirmed.
MAY, J., and ROBB, J., concur.