BOEHM, J.
We hold that an employee filling multiple positions with the same employer is eligible for leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act if that employee’s total service is sufficient to qualify, even if service in either position alone does not qualify. We hold that a “front pay” award for future lost wages should be discounted to its present value. We otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Our conclusion that the 1,250-hour requirement applies to the employee’s overall service to the employer is supported by the legislative history of the FMLA and applicable federal regulations. Committee reports accompanying passage of the FMLA instruct that the “minimum hours of service requirement is meant to be construed broadly.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 35 (1993); S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 25 (1993). The FMLA directs that regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2008), apply under the FMLA for determining hours of service. § 2611(2)(C). Under the FLSA, to determine hours worked for purposes of overtime compensation “the employer must total all the hours worked by the employee for him in that workweek (even though two or more unrelated job assignments may have been performed) . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 778.103 (2008). Similarly, FMLA regulations provide that the determination of hours worked “is not limited by methods of recordkeeping, or by compensation agreements that do not accurately reflect all the hours an employee has worked for or been in service to the employer. Any accurate accounting of actual hours worked under FLSA’s principles may be used.” Id. § 825.110(c)(1); see also H.R. Rep. 103-8(I), at 35 (same); S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 25 (same). Finally, the regulations provide that “[n]ormally the legal entity which employs the employee is the employer under FMLA. Applying this principle, a corporation is a single employer rather than its separate establishments or divisions.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(c); see also id. § 825.600 (describing the “school board” as the employer for purposes of the 50-employee test in its example). Thus, GCSC-the legal entity employing Powell-is the employer under the FMLA, even though Powell had separate academic and athletic supervisors.
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Given the statements of GCSC’s athletic director, the temporal proximity of the statements to the newspaper articles, and Powell’s rebuttal of GCSC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons, the jury had sufficient evidence to find that Powell’s protected actions were causally related to his not being rehired as head football coach.
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Following entry of the judgment, Powell requested prejudgment interest and GCSC moved to discount the front pay award to its present value. The trial court granted Powell’s motion but denied GCSC’s. Powell argues that GCSC waived its claim to discount the front pay award by failing to raise the issue during trial, in its supplemental briefing, or in its motion to correct errors. These issues were first presented when the trial court awarded front pay. We do not find them waived when they were raised in post-trial motions and the trial court addressed them.
In this case, Powell presented evidence that he would have continued to coach football and basketball until 2014, and that his pay for those positions would have increased at three percent per year. Powell claimed total future lost wages of $91,280.91, and the trial court awarded that amount. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in awarding front pay in exercise of its equity jurisdiction, but front pay should be discounted to present value. Without discounting, Powell would receive a windfall in the form of the use of the money years before it would have been earned. See Downey, 510 F.3d at 544 (listing discounting any award to present value as a consideration in awarding front pay); see also Whittington, 429 F.3d at 1001; Arban, 354 F.3d at 406; Nichols, 251 F.3d at 504.
GCSC points us to 28 U.S.C. 1961 (2008), which generally provides for the interest rate “on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.” We do not believe this statute applies here. It is a general provision for postjudgment interest on federal court judgments and is not specific to the FMLA. There is no clear federal authority regarding the discount rate applicable to an award of front pay under the FMLA. In the absence of federal authority, we use the Indiana statutory rate of eight percent, which is the same annual rate the trial court used to add prejudgment interest.
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This case is remanded for the trial court to discount the front pay award to present value. The judgment of the trial court is otherwise affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, RUCKER, JJ., concur.
DICKSON, J., dissents, believing that the Court of Appeals correctly decided the issues in the case.