SULLIVAN, J.
A woman seeks compensation for the value of her services while caring for her mother when the mother was subject to a guardianship. Indiana law presumes that services by a family member are rendered gratuitously. In this case, the presumption cannot be rebutted by evidence that the mother wanted her daughter to be compensated because the mother was under a guardianship and the guardian did not consent.
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We recognize that in general, “[w]here one accepts valuable services from another the law implies a promise to pay for them.” Schwartz v. Schwartz, 773 N.E.2d 348, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Estate of Hann v. Hann, 614 N.E.2d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). Indeed, this principle appropriately applies to general creditors. “However, where the parties are family members living together, and the services are rendered in the family context, no implication of a promise to pay by the recipient arises.” Id. at 355. Instead, in these circumstances, the rebuttable presumption is that services are gratuitous. See Hill v. Hill, 121 Ind. 255, 23 N.E. 87, 88-89 (1889); Cole v. Cole, 517 N.E.2d 1248, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Schroeder v. Schroeder, 117 Ind. App. 410, 70 N.E.2d 764, 765 (1947)). The public policy advanced by this presumption is that family members “have reciprocal, natural, and moral duties to support and care for each other.” Cole, 517 N.E.2d at 1250. To rebut the presumption that her services were rendered gratuitously, Womersley relied on the typed and signed “Statement of Margaret H. Prickett.” The statement expressed Mrs. Prickett’s desire that the guardian of her estate compensate Womersley for her services. Womersley submitted affidavits of two people who witnessed Mrs. Prickett’s execution of the statement and opined that Mrs. Prickett had been “well aware of what she was doing and her intentions when she executed the [statement].” (App. at 66, 69.)
Our state has traditionally recognized only one way to rebut the presumption that services were rendered gratuitously, which requires evidence of an express or implied contract. Schroeder, 117 Ind. App. at 412, 70 N.E.2d at 765. Rebutting the presumption in this manner requires the family member to demonstrate two specific elements: “an intention on the part of recipient of the services to pay or compensate therefor, and an expectation of pay or compensation on the part of the one rendering the services.” Grout v. Solon, 131 Ind. App. 650, 174 N.E.2d 593, 594 (1961). In the present case the Court of Appeals suggested two additional ways to rebut the presumption that services rendered by a family member are gratuitous: “Where a claimant has paid bills and debts on the decedent’s behalf,” Estate of Prickett, 885 N.E.2d at 627 (citing Forker v. Berkes, 111 Ind. App. 92, 38 N.E.2d 296 (1941)); and “when the ward had requested services and the services were necessary,” Estate of Prickett, 885 N.E.2d at 627-28 (citing Wyneken v. Long, 400 N.E.2d 1147, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)). Based on the second of these two points and relying on Wyneken, the Court of Appeals concluded that Mrs. Prickett’s desire for Womersley to be paid expressed in her written statement rebutted the presumption that Womersley had acted gratuitously. Id.
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We acknowledge that Wyneken also suggests that exigent circumstances may warrant compensation for necessary services that were performed without approval of the guardian. 400 N.E.2d at 1148. But in the absence of the exigent circumstances, the guardian’s approval is required in order to secure compensation for those services. Like implied contracts under Grout and Schwartz, the exigent circumstances exception straightforwardly applies when the provider is a non-family member or general creditor. When the provider is a family member, however, further evidence is needed to rebut the presumption that the services were gratuitous. An exception on a showing of no more than exigent circumstances would consume the presumption’s rule. In any event, Womersley presented no evidence of any exigent circumstances to justify the failure to obtain the guardian’s approval of her compensation. As such, there is no question of whether her services were “necessaries,” to use the Wyneken formulation. That is, even under Wyneken, 1st Source Bank’s approval would have been required to secure payment for her services.
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The evidence Womersley designated does not as a matter of law rebut the presumption that she gratuitously served her mother. We reverse the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON and BOEHM, JJ., concur.
RUCKER, J., concurs in result without separate opinion.