RUCKER, J.
The statutes collectively referred to as the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (“Act”) require defendants convicted of sex and certain other offenses to register with local law enforcement agencies and to disclose detailed personal information, some of which is not otherwise public. In this case we consider a claim that the Act constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause contained in the Indiana Constitution because it applies to a defendant who committed his offense before the statutes were enacted. We conclude that as applied in this case the Act violates the constitutional provision.
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This Court has never addressed whether the analysis of an ex post facto claim under the Indiana Constitution is the same as under the federal Constitution. . . . .
This Court has long observed that even when confronted with similarly worded provisions in the federal constitution, we will nonetheless apply an independent analysis when interpreting provisions in our own constitution. . . . When interpreting similarly worded provisions in the Indiana Constitution, we often rely on federal authority to inform our analysis, even though the outcome may be different. . . . .
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As noted above, the United States Supreme Court concluded that Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act, which is very similar to Indiana’s Act, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06. In reaching its conclusion, the Court applied the “intent-effects” test derived from its prior decisions to determine whether the statute imposed punishment. Id. at 92. Under this test a court first determines whether the legislature meant the statute to establish civil proceedings. Id. If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, then that ends the inquiry, because punishment results. Id. If, however the court concludes that the legislature intended a non-punitive regulatory scheme, then the court must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive in effect as to negate that intention thereby transforming what had been intended as a civil regulatory scheme into a criminal penalty. Id.
Although we reach a different conclusion here than the United States Supreme Court reached in Smith, we agree that the intent-effects test provides an appropriate analytical framework for analyzing ex post facto claims under the Indiana Constitution. [Footnote omitted.] And although a multifactor test is susceptible to different conclusions, the availability of the reported decisions applying the test helps in our analysis.
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In assessing a statute’s effects, the Supreme Court indicated that the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), “provide[] some guidance.” . . . The seven factors are: “[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” . . . The Supreme Court has not explained the relative weight to be afforded each factor. However, the Court has acknowledged that the factors “often point in differing directions” and that no one factor is determinative. . . . .
We first ask “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint.”. . . [T]he Act imposes significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom it applies. . . . .
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. . . Aside from the historical punishment of shaming, the fact that the Act’s reporting provisions are comparable to supervised probation or parole standing alone supports a conclusion that the second Mendoza-Martinez factor favors treating the effects of the Act as punitive when applied in this case. [Footnote omitted.]
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We acknowledge that the Act applies to a few strict liability offenses. [Footnote omitted.] However, it overwhelmingly applies to offenses that require a finding of scienter for there to be a conviction. The few exceptions do not imply a non-punitive effect. We conclude that the third Mendoza-Martinez factor slightly favors treating the effects of the Act as punitive when applied here.
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It is true that to some extent the deterrent effect of the registration and notification provisions of the Act is merely incidental to its regulatory function. And we have no reason to believe the Legislature passed the Act for purposes of retribution – “vengeance for its own sake,” . . . . Nonetheless it strains credulity to suppose that the Act’s deterrent effect is not substantial, or that the Act does not promote “community condemnation of the offender,” . . ., both of which are included in the traditional aims of punishment. We conclude therefore that the fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor slightly favors treating the effects of the Act as punitive when applied to Wallace.
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. . . In sum, it is the determination of guilt of a sex offense, not merely the fact of the conduct and potential for recidivism, that triggers the registration requirement. Because it is the criminal conviction that triggers obligations under the Act, we conclude that this factor supports the conclusion that the Act is punitive in effect as to Wallace.
. . . We cannot disagree that “[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and high,'” . . . , or that registration systems are a legitimate way to protect the public from repeat offenders. We conclude therefore that the sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor clearly favors treating the effects of the Act as regulatory and non-punitive.
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In this jurisdiction the Act makes information on all sex offenders available to the general public without restriction and without regard to whether the individual poses any particular future risk. Indeed we think it significant for this excessiveness inquiry that the Act provides no mechanism by which a registered sex offender can petition the court for relief from the obligation of continued registration and disclosure. Offenders cannot shorten their registration or notification period, even on the clearest proof of rehabilitation. [Footnote omitted.] Thus, the non-punitive purpose of the Act, although of unquestioned importance, does not serve to render as non-punitive a statute that is so broad and sweeping. We conclude that the seventh Mendoza-Martinez factor favors treating the effects of the Act as punitive.
In summary, of the seven factors identified by Mendoza-Martinez as relevant to the inquiry of whether a statute has a punitive effect despite legislative intent that the statute be regulatory and non-punitive, only one factor in our view – advancing a non-punitive interest – points clearly in favor of treating the effects of the Act as non-punitive. The remaining factors, particularly the factor of excessiveness, point in the other direction.
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Richard Wallace was charged, convicted, and served the sentence for his crime before the statutes collectively referred to as the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act were enacted. We conclude that as applied to Wallace, the Act violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution because it imposes burdens that have the effect of adding punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when his crime was committed. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.