BROWN, J.
The final issue is whether the trial court’s application of the 2008 credit restricted felons statute violated the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws. The trial court applied the newly enacted credit restricted felon statute to Upton’s credit time. The credit restricted felon statute was enacted through Pub. L. 80-2008, Sec. 6, which was effective on July 1, 2008 and applied “only to persons convicted after June 30, 2008.” The statute defined “credit restricted felon” as: [A] person who has been convicted of at least one (1) of the following offenses:
(1) Child molesting involving sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct (IC 35-42-4-3(a)), if:
(A) the offense is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age; and
(B) the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.
(2) Child molesting (IC 35-42-4-3) resulting in serious bodily injury or death.
(3) Murder (IC 35-42-1-1), if:
(A) the person killed the victim while committing or attempting to commit child molesting (IC 35-42-4-3);
(B) the victim was the victim of a sex crime under IC 35-42-4 for which the person was convicted; or
(C) the victim of the murder was listed by the state or known by the person to be a witness against the person in a prosecution for a sex crime under IC 35-42-4 and the person committed the murder with the intent to prevent the person from testifying.
Ind. Code § 35-41-1-5.5. “A person who is a credit restricted felon and who is imprisoned for a crime or imprisoned awaiting trial or sentencing is initially assigned to Class IV. A credit restricted felon may not be assigned to Class I or Class II.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-4(b). Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3(d) provides that: “A person assigned to Class IV earns one (1) day of credit time for every six (6) days the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.”
Upton argues that application of the credit restricted felon statutes to him violated the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws. [Footnote omitted.] . . . .
Upton argues that, at the time he committed his offenses, he was eligible for Class I credit time, which would have allowed him to receive one day of credit time for each day he was confined awaiting sentencing, or Class II credit time, which would have allowed him to receive one day of credit time for every two days he was confined awaiting sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3. However, under the credit restricted felon statute, he is only entitled to one day of credit for every six days confined awaiting sentencing. We addressed a similar argument in the context of educational credit time in Paul, 888 N.E.2d at 827, where we held:
When Paul committed the offense, the law provided that he could earn one year of educational credit for an associate’s degree – with no limitation as to the number of such degrees except for the statutory maximum for educational credit time. After the law and DOC policy changed to limit his earning of credit to a single associate’s degree, it reduced the educational credit time available to him for pursuing more than one associate’s degree -by limiting him to credit for a single associate’s degree. “[T]his reduction in [educational credit time] accumulation lengthen[ed] the period that [Paul] must spend in prison,” constricted his “opportunity to earn early release,” and “made more onerous the punishment” for the aggravated battery he committed “before enactment” of the new law and policy. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 35-36, 101 S. Ct. 960, 968 (1981)]. Inasmuch as at the time Paul committed the offense, the statute allowed him to earn more than one associate’s degree and earn one year’s credit for each degree, the application of the new statutory provision and DOC’s policy to deny him credit for both degrees is a violation of his constitutional protections against ex post facto laws.
888 N.E.2d at 827. Based upon Paul and Weaver, the State concedes that Upton is correct, and the application of the credit restricted felon statute to him is an ex post facto violation. . . . Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s determination of Upton’s credit time classification and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. . . . .
Crone, J. and Bradford, J. concur.