DICKSON, J.
This appeal challenges the trial court’s use of sanctions in the course of its enforcement of a mediated settlement in a dispute arising from the denial of an application for subdivision plat approval. We hold that government entities are subject to sanctions under the Indiana Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules, but that in this case the Advisory Plan Commission did not act in bad faith for failing to approve the mediation agreement because it remained subject to the Advisory Plan Commission’s final approval at a public meeting.
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The Developers challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the Plan Commission, as a governmental entity, is immune from the imposition of sanctions under Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules 2.7(E)(3) and 2.10, which apply to mediation and which state, in relevant part:
In the event of any breach or failure to perform under the agreement, upon motion, and after hearing, the court may impose sanctions, including entry of judgment on the agreement.
A.D.R. 2.7(E)(3).
Upon motion by either party and hearing, the court may impose sanctions against any attorney, or party representative who fails to comply with these mediation rules, limited to assessment of mediation costs and/or attorney fees relevant to the process.
A.D.R. 2.10. Our A.D.R. Rules do not contain any provisions expressly granting immunity from sanctions to governmental entities participating in mediation.
Supporting the trial court’s decision on this issue, the Plan Commission urges that governmental entities should not be subject to costs or attorney fees under the A.D.R. Rules, even if the governmental entity mediates in bad faith, emphasizing State v. Carter, 658 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. not sought, and arguing that the A.D.R. Rules do not expressly permit costs or attorney fees to be assessed against a governmental entity.
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Mediation proceedings pursuant to our A.D.R. Rules are deemed to be “in court,” and “in a court sanctioned environment,” irrespective of whether they actually occur inside a courtroom. Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1307 (Ind. 1998). And, as we observed in Fuchs v. Martin, “[a]n order to mediate is not unlike the requirements imposed by our rules governing discovery and other pre-trial procedure.” 845 N.E.2d 1028, 1041 (Ind. 2006). Indiana Trial Rule 37(B)(2) specifically permits discovery sanctions to be imposed upon a governmental organization. Even without explicitly relying upon such authorization, we have recognized that a trial court, in the exercise of its inherent power, has wide discretion to impose sanctions to remedy a discovery violation by the State in criminal cases. Carson v. State, 271 Ind. 203, 206, 391 N.E.2d 600, 602 (1979); Reid v. State, 267 Ind. 555, 565, 372 N.E.2d 1149, 1154-55 (1978). The A.D.R. Rules do not exempt governmental entities. They apply in all civil and domestic relations litigation in Indiana courts. A.D.R. 1.4. Furthermore, A.D.R. 2.7(E)(3) authorizes the imposition of sanctions for “any” breach or failure to perform under an agreement resulting from mediation, and A.D.R. 2.10 authorizes sanctions against “any” attorney or party representative who fails to comply with the mediation rules. No exception is granted to governmental entities or their attorneys.
Until now, this Court has not had occasion to review the proposition espoused in Carter that a trial court may not impose A.D.R. Rule sanctions against a governmental entity. In contrast to the punitive damage rationale employed in Carter, we find that the sanctions authorized by the A.D.R. Rules are more analogous to the exercise of inherent judicial authority than to the imposition of punitive damage awards in civil law suits. Like other parties to litigation who may be involved in a mediation proceeding, governmental entities are equally obligated to comply with the applicable rules and thus should be equally subject to the sanctions authorized to encourage compliance. We therefore disapprove of the portion of Carter that expresses a contrary view, and we now hold that governmental entities are not immune from the power of courts to impose sanctions under the A.D.R. Rules, particularly Rules 2.7(E)(3) and 2.10.
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The Indiana Open Door Law, Ind. Code §§ 5-14-1.5-1 to -8, seeks to assure that govern-ment business “be conducted openly so that the general public may be fully informed.” Dillman v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 848 N.E.2d 348, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Administrative actions taken by delegated representatives of governing bodies, however, are not subject to the Open Door Law. Id. at 353. An advisory plan commission is authorized by statute to delegate authority to perform ministerial acts in all cases “except where final action of the commission is necessary.” Ind. Code § 36-7-4-402(a). As to plats involving land covered by a subdivision control ordinance, the exclusive control over the approval of plats is assigned by statute to plan commissions. Id. § 36-7-4-701. And a plan commission’s act is deemed “not official, unless it is authorized, at a regular or special meeting, by a majority of the entire membership of the plan commission.” Id. § 36-7-4-302(a). We conclude that this statutory scheme operates to preclude the delegation of plan commission authority for final approval of subdivision plats, but instead requires final approval by a majority of the commission members at meetings subject to the Open Door Law. Because the settlement agreement resulting from the mediation was thus not final until its approval by a majority of the Plan Commission at a public meeting, the Commission’s failure to promptly approve the subdivision did not constitute bad faith conduct warranting sanctions.
While we generally favor the amicable settlement of disputes and encourage the use of mediation to facilitate such agreements, these processes cannot substitute for legislatively man-dated official and public assent to the resulting settlement agreements. Resort to mediation can be extremely beneficial to all parties, but, as observed by the Court of Appeals, it is wise practice “to include language in a settlement agreement that the agreement is contingent upon compliance with the Open Door Law and that it must be approved at an open meeting.” Lake County Trust Co., 883 N.E.2d at 136.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.