RUCKER, J.
In 1999, Todd L. Jensen was charged with count one vicarious sexual gratification, as a Class C felony, count two child molesting, as a Class C felony, and count three child molesting as a Class A felony. Under terms of a plea agreement Jensen pleaded guilty to the two Class C felony counts on January 18, 2000. The trial court sentenced Jensen on February 18, 2000, to a concurrent term of six years with three years executed and three years suspended to probation. Under terms of the Act then in effect Jensen was required to report and register as a sex offender for a period of ten years.
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Effective July 1, 2006, the Legislature amended the Act in several respects. Significant to the case before us is an amendment requiring lifetime registration for a defendant whose offense qualifies the defendant as a “sexually violent predator.” [Footnote omitted.] Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19 (2006). Vicarious sexual gratification – one of the offenses to which Jensen pleaded guilty – falls within that category. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.5(b) (2006). In 2006, the definition of “sexually violent predator” contained no limitation on the date of a conviction that could qualify an offender for the designation. Id.2
On September 20, 2006, the Sex Offender Registration Coordinator for the Allen County Sheriff’s Department informed Jensen that he would have to register for life as a sexually violent predator. In response Jensen filed a motion with the trial court to determine his registration status. After a hearing the trial court found Jensen to be a sexually violent predator and determined that Jensen must register for life. Jensen appealed . . . .
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Jensen contends that as applied to him the Act violates both the Indiana and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. In Wallace we noted that the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the State of Alaska’s Sex Offender Registry Act, which is very similar to Indiana’s Act, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Wallace, ___ N.E.2d ____, slip op. at 4. We thus proceeded to evaluate Wallace’s claim under the Indiana Constitution albeit adopting the same analytical framework the Supreme Court employed to evaluate ex post facto claims under the federal constitution. Id. at 10. We do the same here. . . . .
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. . . [A]t the time Jensen pleaded guilty he was required to register for ten years. Nothing mentioned above imposes any greater burden on Jensen or has any greater adverse affect now that he is required to register for a longer period.
We do acknowledge at least two differences. Unlike other offenders, offenders determined to be sexually violent predators must (1) inform local law enforcement authorities of their plans to travel from their principal place of residence for more than 72 hours, Ind. Code § 11-8-8-18 (2006), and (2) re-register for the rest of their lives, id. at -19. [Footnote omitted.] These restraints lean slightly in favor of treating the effects of the Act as punitive when applied to Jensen.
. . . [T]he 2006 amendment to the Act imposed an additional “shaming” punishment to which Jensen was not previously exposed, namely: posting the face of a sexually violent predator on a webpage under the label “Sex Predator.” . . . We conclude therefore that the second Mendoza-Martinez factor leans in favor of treating the effects of the Act as punitive when applied to Jensen.
. . . [T]he Act makes Jensen’s criminal conviction for vicarious sexual gratification a prerequisite for registration and notification as a sexually violent predator. This third factor slightly favors treating the effects of the Act as punitive when applied to Jensen.
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There is no question that the Act’s deterrent effect is substantial and that the Act promotes community condemnation of offenders – both of which are traditional aims of punishment. But this is so whether applied to an offender who is required to register for ten years or an offender required to register for life. Essentially, as to this factor Jensen is in no different position now than he was before the Act was amended in 2006. Therefore this fourth factor favors treating the effects of the Act as non-punitive when applied to Jensen.
Under the fifth factor we consider “whether the behavior to which [the statute] applies is already a crime.” . . . Jensen’s behavior was criminal both before and after the 2006 amendment. With the exception of an extended period of registration, Jensen is in the exact position he was in when he pleaded guilty. We conclude the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor favors treating the effects of the Act as non-punitive when applied to Jensen.
We next ask whether, in the words of the Supreme Court, “an alternative purpose to which [the statute] may rationally be connected is assignable for it.” Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69. This statement is best translated as an inquiry into whether the Act advances a legitimate regulatory purpose. Wallace, ___ N.E.2d at ___, slip op. at 16. The answer is yes. “We cannot disagree that the risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is frightening and high or that registration systems are a legitimate way to protect the public from repeat offenders.” Id. (internal quotation omitted) (alterations omitted). We thus conclude that the sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor also favors treating the effects of the Act as non-punitive when applied to Jensen.
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. . . [T]he effects of the Act apply to Jensen much differently than they applied to appellant Wallace. The “broad and sweeping” disclosure requirements were in place and applied to Jensen at the time of his guilty plea in January 2000. Nothing in that regard was changed by the 2006 amendments. And with regard to lifetime registration, we note that sexually violent predators may, after ten years, “petition the court to consider whether the person should no longer be considered a sexually violent predator.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.5(g) (2006). We conclude therefore that the seventh Mendoza-Martinez factor favors treating the effects of the Act as non-punitive when applied to Jensen.
In summary, of the seven factors identified by Mendoza-Martinez as relevant to the inquiry of whether a statute has a punitive effect despite legislative intent that the statute be regulatory and non-punitive, only three lean in favor of treating the effects of the Act as punitive when applied to Jensen. The remaining factors point in the other direction. Importantly, the last Mendoza-Martinez factor, which we afford “considerable weight in deciding whether the [Act is] punitive-in-fact,” Wallace, ___ N.E.2d ___, slip op. at 17 (citation omitted), leans in favor of treating the Act as non-punitive when applied to Jensen. We conclude therefore that Jensen has not carried his burden of demonstrating that as applied to him the Act violates the Indiana constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Shepard, C.J., concurs.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs in result with separate opinion:
. . . I do not believe Jensen’s claim that these 2006 amendments imposed additional punishment on him is ripe for adjudication. For this reason, I concur only in the result of the Court’s opinion.
Under the law in effect at the time of his conviction, Jensen is required to register under the Act for a period of 10 years following his release from incarceration. Only when the 10 year period has run – several years from now – will Jensen be subject to a registration requirement that might arguably be ex post facto. But, of course, the Legislature might very well change this statute prior to that date so that Jensen would not be subject to any additional registration requirement at all. . . . .
Jensen’s claim is not ripe for another, separate reason. Under the Act, Jensen is entitled to petition the court for a determination that he should no longer be considered a sexually violent predator. I.C. 35-38-1-7.5(g) (Supp. 2007). He will be entitled to apply for this determination 10 years after the date of his release from incarceration. If he receives a favorable determination, he will not be subject to the registration or other requirements of the Act. Id. This means that even under the 2006 amendments, he might only be subject to the registration requirements of the Act for 10 years, the same period of time with respect to which he was initially subject to registration under the terms of the Act then in effect. The question presented in this case would be ripe for consideration by us only if a trial court to which such a petition is submitted deter-mined that Jensen continues to be a sexually violent predator as defined in the Act.
BOEHM, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Dickson, J., concurs:
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the implicit holding of the majority that this case is ripe for resolution. However, I believe the enhanced registration requirements enacted in 2006 constitute an additional punishment that violates the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to Jensen, whose crimes were committed in 1998.
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There are several problems in applying the 2006 registration requirements to 1998 of-fenders. First, the 2006 law extends the period of registration from 10 years to life. We hold today in Wallace v. State that the registration requirement is punitive and therefore cannot constitutionally be applied to a person whose crime occurred before the statute was enacted. . . . It seems to me that if the registration requirement is punitive, extending its period is no less additional punishment than extending a period of incarceration, and equally violates the constitutional ban on ex post facto legislation.
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In my view, the 2006 amendments exhibit yet another aspect of a punitive provision because they promote the traditional aims of punishment. . . . More recent thinking views incapacitation-which constrains the offender from further crimes-as distinct from deterrence of the offender and others by threat of future punishment. . . . The registration requirement, although less restrictive than incarceration, incapacitates the offender by effectively constraining travel and providing authorities and the public with information to monitor the individual continuously.
Moreover, there is an aspect of retribution to these provisions. . . . [R]egistration is akin to a “shaming penalty” requiring an offender to undertake the unpleasant task of broadcasting his offense-a sanction many view as retributive. . . .This factor further supports the conclusion that the amended registration requirements are punitive.
In my view, the seventh Mendoza-Martinez factor is entitled to the greatest weight and is most important in determining these sanctions to be punitive. Without some individualized determination of continued risk, the requirements of the 2006 amendments are excessive in relation to their stated purpose. . . . .
Finally, I disagree with Justice Sullivan’s conclusion that Jensen’s claim is not yet ripe for adjudication. As already noted, the 2006 statute imposed new requirements on Jensen in addition to lengthening the period of required registration. Because these new requirements applied to Jensen on the statute’s 2006 effective date, Jensen is entitled to challenge their constitutionality now.