DICKSON, J.
Governing Indiana case law is inconclusive regarding the necessity and function of prejudice in evaluating an insurer’s alleged failure to perform when its insured fails to comply with a policy notice requirement. In Miller v. Dilts, 463 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. 1984), this Court distinguished insurance policy provisions requiring an insured to give notice to the insurer from provisions requiring the insured to cooperate with the insurer’s investigation and defense of a claim, holding that an insurer “must show actual prejudice from an insured’s noncompliance with the policy’s cooperation clause before it can avoid liability under the policy.” Id. at 261. But where there is a violation of a notice provision, which is a “threshold requirement” for coverage, Miller opined that prejudice will “be presumed from an unreasonable delay in notifying the company.” Id. at 265. In contrast, however, this Court briefly revisited the issue in Morris v. Economy Fire and Casualty Co., again noting that “disputes regarding alleged breaches of an insured’s duty under a separate ‘cooperation clause’ may necessitate consideration of resulting prejudiced to the insurance company.” 848 N.E.2d at 666. But unlike cooperation clause violations, and in significant contrast to the “presumed prejudice” rationale espoused in Miller, we summarily declared that “prejudice is not a necessary consideration in determining the enforceability of other insurance policy provisions,” but did not express explicit disapproval of Miller’s presumption of prejudice formulation. Id.
A significant variation is found in decisions from other jurisdictions that have considered the issue. . . . .
Appraising the distribution of views differently, Dean Holmes believes that only in a decreasing minority of jurisdictions is the insurer not required to show that it was prejudiced by an insured’s lack of compliance with the policy notice requirement. Eric Mills Holmes, 22 HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D §139.4, 316 (2003). He explains that under this “no-prejudice rule,” compliance with the notice requirements are conditions precedent to an insurer’s coverage obligations, and thus defective notice eliminates the insurer’s obligation, even if the insurer was not prejudiced by the untimely or defective notice. Id. at §139.4[A], 316. In contrast, Holmes believes that “the overwhelming majority of states” follow a “prejudice rule” in which an insurer must demonstrate actual prejudice from a failure of proper notice. Id. at §139.4[C], 321. He also acknowledges that a “number of jurisdictions” address the issue by creating a rebuttable presumption of prejudice in favor of the insurer. Id. at §139[C][b], 328. Noting only Miller and not Morris, he places Indiana in this category.
The facts of the present case, however, compel the same outcome regardless of which approach is followed. It is important to first recognize what this case is not about. Dreaded is not seeking reimbursement for defense costs it incurred because St. Paul refused to defend after receiving notice of the IDEM claim. See, e.g., Walton v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 844 N.E.2d 143, 146-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Dreaded is not seeking indemnity for a damages judgment entered against it because St. Paul failed to defend after notice. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 672 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Dreaded does not here contend that it provided a timely notice of claim that, while defective in some respect, nevertheless substantially complied with the policy requirements or that its failure to give notice is legally excused. See, e.g., Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Aires Envtl. Servs., Ltd., 259 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2001). Nor is this case about whether St. Paul had sufficient constructive notice from other sources to trigger its duty to defend notwithstanding a lack of notice directly from Dreaded. See, e.g., Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 645 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. 1995); Wolf Lake Terminals, Inc. v. Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 2d 933, 951-52 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (collecting cases); Brandon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 810 (N.Y. 2002). Today’s case differs from those in which an insurer seeks to completely disclaim its policy obligations on grounds that the insured didn’t report the claim to the insurer within the time constraints in the policy’s notice provision-here, e.g., “as soon as possible.” Appellant’s App’x at 236. St. Paul is not claiming late notice as an excuse to avoid its prospective obligations after receiving notice. See, e.g., Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 259-60. Dreaded’s claim for damages is predicated solely on its contention that St. Paul breached the “duty to defend a protected person against a claim or suit for injury or damage covered by this agreement.” Appellant’s App’x at 76.
But an insurer cannot defend a claim of which it has no knowledge. The function of a notice requirement is to supply basic information to permit an insurer to defend a claim. The insurer’s duty to defend simply does not arise until it receives the foundational information designated in the notice requirement. Until an insurer receives such enabling information, it cannot be held accountable for breaching this duty.
Dreaded’s complete failure to comply with the notice requirement is undisputed. For more than three years, Dreaded was aware of IDEM’s environmental claim against it and failed to inform St. Paul. Yet Dreaded now asserts that St. Paul breached its policy obligation to defend Dreaded during the time St. Paul knew nothing about the claim.
Under the facts of this case, prejudice is irrelevant. The issue is simply whether the insurer had any duty to defend at all. St. Paul’s duty to defend did not arise until Dreaded complied with the policy’s notice requirement. St. Paul is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.