DICKSON, J.
Declining to apply statutes that prohibit operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated to a defendant driving a vehicle on his own private property, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. We reverse and hold that Indiana Code §§ 9-30-5-1(b) and 9-30-5-2 apply when a motorist is driving on public or private property, including property owned by the motorist.
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The statutory language relevant to the two criminal offenses charged against the defendant is as follows:
A person who operates a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least fifteen-hundredths (0.15) gram of alcohol per:
(1) one hundred (100) milliliters of the person’s blood; or
(2) two hundred ten (210) liters of the person’s breath; commits a Class A misdemeanor.
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b).
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a Class C misdemeanor.
(b) An offense described in subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor if the person operates a vehicle in a manner that endangers a person.
Id. § 9-30-5-2. Neither provision expressly limits its application to public highways nor designates application to private property in any way.
The defendant argues that the legislature intended these offenses not to apply to a person’s operation of a motor vehicle on the person’s own private property, and he urges consideration of the separate definitions for “vehicle” and “operator.” In the definitions section of the Motor Vehicle Code, “operator” of a motor vehicle means a person who drives or controls a motor vehicle “upon a highway.” Id. § 9-13-2-118(a)(1). And “vehicle” means a device by which a person or property may be transported “upon a highway.” Id. § 9-13-2-196(a). “Highway,” in turn, is defined to refer to “every publicly maintained way when any part of the way is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” Id. § 9-13-2-73. We note that neither of the statutory provisions under which the defendant was charged employs the words “operator” or “highway.”
Our paramount concern in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 501 (Ind. 1999). As to the scope of application of Chapter 5, which governs offenses related to driving while intoxicated, we need not speculate about the in-tent of the legislature. The General Assembly has been emphatic, explicit, and unequivocal: “It is not a defense in an action under [Chapter 5] that the accused person was operating a vehicle in a place other than on a highway.” Ind. Code § 9-30-5-9. [Footnote omitted.] Thus, regardless of where the defendant’s driving occurred, whether on public or private property, and even if on the defendant’s own property, the State is authorized to charge him with intoxicated driving offenses pursuant to Indiana Code §§ 9-30-5-1 and 9-30-5-2.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.