SHEPARD, C.J.
This appeal arises from an order of adoption granted to a New Jersey resident for children brought to Indianapolis for their birth to a South Carolina woman who had been inseminated with biological material from California. The adoption petitioner asked the trial court to waive various legislative safeguards designed to protect infants who are proposed for adoption. We reverse.
Twin girls whom we will call Infants H were born at Methodist Hospital in Indianapolis in early April 2005, and a few days later, on April 13, attorney Steve Litz filed a petition for adoption on behalf of a man we will call Petitioner. The petition described the children as “white females” and asserted that Petitioner was an Indiana resident, born in Indiana, and employed as a teacher. The woman who gave birth, 23-year-old Zaria, attached an affidavit saying that she was inseminated with combined sperm from Petitioner and an unknown donor, and that she was waiving her rights with regard to the newborns. The trial court held a hearing on the same day the petition was filed. Petitioner testified on his petition. He indicated that Zaria had been inseminated with sperm from him and from another donor. (Apr. 13, 2005, Tr. at 5-6.) He said he was “currently residing in Indianapolis” but worked as a school teacher in Union City, New Jersey. The court indicated orally it would approve the adoption. It released the children to Petitioner pending a final hearing and declared that the statutory requirement of prior written approval of a licensed placement agency or the Marion County Office of Family and Children (Ind. Code § 31-19-7-1) was being waived. Litz subsequently provided the court with a document called an “Adoption Summary” prepared by “Paralegal on Call, Inc.,” generated on April 27th. The report indicated that the babies were born prematurely, but were progressing, and that they were “not considered ‘hard to place’ as defined by I.C. § 31-9-2-51.” The report indicated that Petitioner was born in New York (not in Indiana, as the petition to adopt had alleged). (Appellant’s App. at 213.) It said Petitioner had lived for the last ten years in an apartment in Union City. (Id. at 214.) (The Indianapolis residence alleged in the adoption petition turned out to be a hotel.) The report said the mother was a 23-year-old Caucasian. The trial court received the report and issued an adoption order two days later on April 29th.
In the meantime, personnel at Methodist Hospital’s Newborn Intensive Care Unit became concerned “about [Petitioner’s] ability to appropriately care” for the Infants H and asked Child Protective Services at the Marion County Office of Family and Children (now the Department of Child Services) to investigate. (Exhibits Vol. I, Ex. A at 8.) That office reported to the Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division, that Petitioner had appeared in the ICU carrying a bird, which hospital personnel thought represented a risk of infection. On a separate occasion he had come to visit with bird feces on his clothing, “with no concern [for] the children’s health and potential disease that could spread.” Id. Petitioner told the hospital staff that he planned to drive the two three-pound premature infants back to New Jersey in his automobile, alone, and had not yet thought about how he would manage for their care while he worked. The Marion Superior Court determined that the infants were in need of services and ordered them in the custody of the Office of Family and Children, on May 2nd. Among other things, the court observed that the requirements of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, Ind. Code ch. 31-28-4, were not being followed. (Appellant’s App. at 129-30.) Alerted to the CHINS investigation, attorney Litz moved on May 4th to amend the adoption court’s order to add a finding that the children where hard to place, as defined by Ind. Code § 31-9-2-51(1)(B), on grounds that Zaria was African-American and that the children were therefore biracial. (Id. at 185-86.) This motion was neither supported by affidavit nor otherwise verified under penalties of perjury. Actually, it turned out that Zaria had received donor eggs, so the grounds on which Litz asserted the children to be biracial were untrue. (Id. at 54.) The earlier representation that Petitioner was a sperm donor likewise turned out to be untrue. (Tr. at 115.)
The adoption judge’s effort to deal with these successive shifting factual claims was understandably daunting. The court observed that the petition to adopt and counsel’s subsequent submissions reflected “lack of candor and mass confusion of crucial factors. . . .” (Appellant’s App. at 54.) We have not undertaken here to detail each twist in the road. Suffice it to say that in July 2005, the trial court vacated the original decree of adoption and an amended version that had been entered Nunc Pro Tunc. (Id. at 165-66.) In November 2005, Petitioner’s lawyer moved again to amend the petition for adoption, and requested a final hearing. (Id. at 68-70.) This time, he asserted that the infants were hard to place because they were part of a sibling group, citing Ind. Code § 31-9-2-51(2). (Id.) In January 2006, the adoption court held its last hearing. It ordered a six-month period of supervision over the placement of the infants with Petitioner. (Id. at 45-59.) It entered a final decree of adoption on October 17, 2006. (Id. at 4-5.) The trial court contemporaneously dismissed the CHINS case and found that consent to adoption by the Department of Child Services was not required. (Id.) The Court of Appeals affirmed. In re Adoption of Infants H., 878 N.E.2d 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We grant transfer.
. . . .
Whatever else may be tortured about this litigation, it is unquestioned that none of the participants were residents of Hamilton County. The disconnect between the adoption proceedings and the CHINS proceedings as respects Infants H underscores the importance of honoring the legislative judgment about venue. Faced with situations like the instant case, the adoption court should transfer the matter to the county where the children are located.
The General Assembly has required that before a child may be placed in a proposed adoptive home, the Department of Child Services or a child placing agency licensed by the Department must give prior written approval. Ind. Code § 31-19-7-1(a) (2008). It seems obvious enough that this legislative directive is designed to protect children, certainly including infants like those who are the subject of this case. . . .
Because the CHINS proceedings gave DCS knowledge about the pending adoption, it was later able to intervene in the adoption court. Otherwise, it could not have done so. Dispensing with the Department’s statutory role before the Department even knew of the adoption, based solely on the Petitioner’s request, was error. Among the most important safeguards for children, whom it is contemplated will be sent to live with adoptive parents in another state, is the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. The Department contends that the adoption court did not comply with the Compact. Counsel for Petitioner does not dispute this.
. . . .
The adoption court was on the right track when it indicated early on that it would not grant the adoption without complete Compact compliance. . . . .
Indiana retains jurisdiction over the Infants H because of the Compact. Article V of the Compact governs jurisdiction and provides as follows: “The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine all matters relating to the custody, supervision, care, treatment and disposition of the child, which the sending agency would have had if the child had remained in the sending agency’s state…” Ind. Code § 31-28-4-1 (article V). See In the Matter of C.B., 616 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
We reverse the final order of adoption for want of compliance with the Interstate Compact and remand with directions to comply with the Compact, and thereafter to issue further judgment accordingly. The order granting Petitioner preliminary custody may remain in effect pending completion of this directive and such eventual order as the trial court may enter.
Dickson, Sullivan, and Boehm, JJ., concur.
Rucker, J., concurs in result.