MAY, J.
Officer Mikulich did not disclose in his police report or deposition that Booker had said, “You know I’m not really a bad guy, I just sell a little here to make ends meet.” Officer Mikulich first told the prosecutor about this statement the week before trial. The prosecutor did not share this information with defense counsel. Defense counsel first learned about Booker’s alleged statement in the State’s direct examination of Officer Mikulich during its case in chief.
At that point, defense counsel told the trial court the State had not provided Booker’s statement in discovery and moved for a mistrial. After some argument, the prosecutor asked the court to admonish the jury to disregard Officer Mikulich’s testimony about Booker’s statement. The trial court declined to give an admonition and gave the parties twenty minutes to research whether there had been a discovery violation. After hearing additional arguments, the trial court denied the motion for mistrial, and the State resumed its examination of Officer Mikulich. On cross-examination, defense counsel established that Officer Mikulich had not put Booker’s statement in his report and had only recently told the prosecutor about it. Both parties addressed Officer Mikulich’s omission in their closing arguments.
. . . [T]he State argues the prosecutor was not required to disclose the statement because it was within Booker’s knowledge. . . . .
. . . The State’s argument assumes Booker in fact made the statement. Booker, however, denies making the statement, and the jury’s general verdict does not reveal whether it found Booker made the statement. Furthermore, even when a defendant acknowledges he has made an incriminating statement, it is critical for the defendant to know what the State will claim he said. See Long v. State, 431 N.E.2d 875, 877-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (finding due process violation where prosecutor did not disclose Long’s written statement in response to Long’s discovery request “regardless of whether Long should have known of its existence”). Therefore, we decline to assume Booker made the statement or hold his knowledge of his own statements necessarily excuses any discovery violation. Instead, we will determine whether the prosecutor in fact committed a discovery violation.
. . . .
The trial court concluded no discovery violation had occurred. The State has a constitutional duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant, but there is no affirmative duty to provide inculpatory evidence. . . . Discovery is governed by Ind. Trial Rule 26, which does not provide for mandatory disclosures. . . . A discovery order was issued in this case, but Booker acknowledges an unrecorded oral statement does not fall under any of the categories of evidence covered by the order. (See Appellant’s App. at 14) (parties required to disclose “witnesses’ written or recorded statements”). Defense counsel argued to the trial court that it was customary practice in Lake County to disclose all incriminating statements made by a defendant; however, Booker has not shown such disclosure is required by any local rule. Had Booker requested the disclosure of all statements he was alleged to have made, the State would have been required to comply, see Long, 431 N.E.2d at 877; however, he made no such request.
Booker has not identified any authority requiring the prosecutor to affirmatively disclose his alleged statement; therefore, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred by finding there was no discovery violation. Nevertheless, the trial court noted disclosure would have been the “honorable” and “right” thing to do, . . . and we agree. Discovery rules are designed to allow liberal discovery and to eliminate surprise with a minimum of court involvement. Old Indiana LLC v. Montano ex rel. Montano, 732 N.E.2d 179, 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied 753 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2001). Defense counsel might have stumbled on the evidence had he asked the right question when deposing Officer Mikulich; however, there was nothing to alert him to the need to pursue such line of questioning. Knowing Booker’s statement was not in the police report or other discovery materials and defense counsel was likely unaware of the statement, the prosecutor should have disclosed it. The failure to do so did not promote the goals of discovery. We note the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provide a prosecutor should disclose “[a]ll written and all oral statements of the defendant or of any codefendant that are within the possession or control of the prosecution and that relate to the subject matter of the offense charged, and any documents relating to the acquisition of such statements.” Standard 11-2.1 of ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Discovery, available at www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
Although we do not condone the prosecutor’s conduct, it was not a discovery violation. Nor is there a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if the prosecutor had promptly disclosed the statement.
FREIDLANDER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.