RUCKER, J.
The trial court modified the custody of a minor from the child [(K.I)]’s maternal grandmother [(J.I.)] to the child’s natural father [(J.H.)]. The trial court also directed that grandmother be granted visitation consistent with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. We conclude the trial court correctly modified custody but erred in directing the parties to rely on the Guidelines to determine visitation.
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It is of course true that a party seeking a change of custody must persuade the trial court that “(1) modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider under section 2 and, if applicable, section 2.5 of this chapter.” I.C. § 31-14-13-6; see also Heagy v. Kean, 864 N.E.2d 383, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that “[m]odification of child custody may occur only when a parent can demonstrate modification is in the best interests of the child, and there is a substantial change in one or more factors the court may consider.'”). But these are modest requirements where the party seeking to modify custody is the natural parent of a child who is in the custody of a third party. The parent comes to the table with a “strong presumption that a child’s interests are best served by placement with the natural parent.” B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287. Hence the first statutory requirement is met from the outset. And because a substantial change in any one of the statutory factors will suffice, “the interaction and interrelationship of the child with . . . the child’s parents,” see Indiana Code Section 31-14-13-2(2) – one of grounds on which the trial court relied in this case – satisfies the second statutory requirement. In essence, although in a very technical sense, a natural parent seeking to modify custody has the burden of establishing the statutory requirements for modification by showing modification is in the child’s best interest, and that there has been a substantial change in one or more of the enumerated factors, as a practical matter this is no burden at all. More precisely, the burden is minimal. Once this minimal burden is met, the third party must prove by clear and convincing evidence “that the child’s best interests are substantially and significantly served by placement with another person.” B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287. If the third party carries this burden, then custody of the child remains in the third party. Otherwise, custody must be modified in favor of the child’s natural parent. In this case, because J.I. failed to carry her burden, the trial court properly granted J.H.’s petition to modify custody in J.H.’s favor. On this point we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In addition to modifying custody in J.H.’s favor, the trial court also ordered “that [J.I.] is to have visitation pursuant to the non-custodial parent’s visitation provided under the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.” Appellant’s App. at 12. On cross-appeal J.H. argued the trial court abused its discretion in entering this order because it interferes with his parental rights and K.I.’s relationship with her parents. J.H. agrees that J.I. should have continuing contact with K.I. However, he contends that visitation should not be granted pursuant to the Guidelines. The Court of Appeals tacitly agreed and directed the court on remand to determine whether J.I. should be granted grandparent visitation under Indiana Code section 31-17-5-1 or de facto custodian visitation under Indiana Code section 31-9-2-35.5. In Re Matter Of The Paternity Of K.I., slip op. at 7-8.
We agree that J.I. is not entitled to visitation pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. It is true that the Guidelines acknowledge a child’s basic need “[t]o develop and maintain meaningful relationships with other significant adults (grandparents, stepparents and other relatives) as long as these relationships do not interfere with or replace the child’s primary relationship with the parents.” Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines, A Child’s Basic Needs (8). However, as the Court of Appeals has observed, “The guideline’s title – Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines – indicates that they apply to parents, not other family members. More to the point: The Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines are based on the premise that it is usually in a child’s best interest to have frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with each parent.’ Given this specificity and the repeated references to parents’ throughout the guidelines, we suggest they have no mandatory application to grandparent visitation disputes.” Woodruff v. Klein, 762 N.E.2d 223, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied in original); see also Spaulding v. Williams, 793 N.E.2d. 252, 263-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (noting trial court error in entering a visitation order in favor of grandparents pursuant to the Guidelines that “erroneously treat Grandparents as if they were parents” and declaring, “[p]arenting Guidelines do not apply to grandparent visitation matters”).
But we disagree with our colleagues that the de facto custodian statute provides J.I. any relief. More specifically, even assuming J.I. qualifies as a de facto custodian that status bears only on the question of custody. See Indiana Code § 31-14-13-2.5(b)(2) (providing in relevant part “In addition to the factors listed in section 2 of this chapter, the court shall consider the following factors in determining custody: . . . The extent to which the child has been cared for, nurtured, and supported by the de facto custodian.”) (emphasis added). The apparent intent of the de facto custodian statute is to clarify that a third party may have standing in certain custody proceedings, and that it may be in a child’s best interests to be placed in that party’s custody. In re Guardianship of L.L., 745 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The statute is silent on the question of visitation. In a modification proceeding, once the trial court determines that it is in the child’s best interest that custody be granted to the natural parent, we must look elsewhere for guidance on whether and to what extent a third party may be granted visitation. That brings us to our next discussion. Although grandparents do not have the legal rights or obligations of parents and do not possess a constitutional liberty interest with their grandchildren, nonetheless Indiana Code section 31-17-5-1, commonly referred to as the Grandparent Visitation Act, represents a Legislative recognition that “a child’s best interest is often served by developing and maintaining contact with his or her grandparents.” Swartz v. Swartz, 720 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, in drafting the Act, the Legislature balanced two competing interests: “the rights of the parents to raise their children as they see fit and the rights of grandparents to participate in the lives of their grandchildren.” Id. at 1222.
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Although this case involves the visitation rights of a grandparent, it was not litigated under the Grandparent Visitation Act. Instead the trial court granted visitation in the context of a custody modification proceeding. And it did so directing visitation pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. For the reasons previously discussed this was error. We therefore reverse the trial court on this point and remand this cause with instructions to enter appropriate findings and conclusions consistent with this opinion and the Grandparent Visitation Act.1
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This cause is remanded for further proceedings.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.