CRONE, J.
On August 16, 2007, Detective Pete Hose of the Madison County Sheriff’s Department in Huntsville, Alabama contacted Detective Randy Kaps of the St. Joseph County Police Department. Detective Hose explained that an arrest warrant had been issued for Shotts one day earlier and that he believed Shotts was in Mishawaka. Detective Kaps accessed the National Crime Information Computer (“NCIC”) and confirmed that there was an active Alabama arrest warrant for Shotts. He then asked two officers with the St. Joseph County Warrant Division-Corporal Daniel Wisniewski and Trooper Mike Robinson-to execute the Alabama arrest warrant.
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Shotts argues that the police violated his rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution by acting on a facially defective arrest warrant and that the evidence seized during his arrest should have been excluded as a result. In response, the State first contends that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable here because the Alabama arrest warrant was in fact valid. Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11, a warrant shall not issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. Doss v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). In this case, a Madison County, Alabama, magistrate issued the arrest warrant based upon the following affiant statement:
Before me, THE UNDERSIGNED, Warrant Magistrate of Madison County, personally appeared this day [INV. D. HASTY] and made oath that he/she has probable cause for believing and does believe, that before the filing of this complaint, [DAVID ANDREW SHOTTS] whose name is not known to the affiant other than as stated, did receive, retain, or dispose of stolen property, [48 AMD PROCESSORS], the property of [BENCHMARK ELECTRONICS], of the value of [$19,858.00], knowing that it was stolen or having reasonable grounds to believe it had been stolen and not having the intent to restore it to its owner, in violation of 13A-8-17 of the Code of Alabama, which said offense was committed against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama. State’s Exh. 1.
Shotts directs us to a case in which our supreme court considered a similar affidavit. In Kinnaird v. State, 242 N.E.2d 500, 251 Ind. 506 (1968), the defendant argued that the affidavit filed in support of his arrest warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. The affidavit read as follows:
Marion Deckard being duly sworn upon oath says, that at the County of Clark, in the State of Indiana, on or about the 24th day of February, 1967, Charles “Sonny” Kinnaird did then and there commit the crime of theft of the property of Everett Page, doing business as Federal Window and Awning Company in that he knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously obtained control over said property, to-wit: One Radial arm saw, One grinder, two paint spray guns, one set acetyline torches and gauge, one transit and tripod, and one sabre saw, all of the value of $616.00, knowing that said property had been stolen by another, to-wit: Lee Redd and Richard L. Sheckles, intending to deprive the owner permanently of the use of said property, being then and there, contrary to the form of statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana. Id. at 501. In Kinnaird, our supreme court held that “an affidavit which merely states the conclusion of the affiant is insufficient to establish probable cause.” Id. at 505 (citing Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958) (holding that commissioner should not accept without question affiant’s mere conclusion that person whose arrest is sought has committed a crime). The affidavit must be supported by enough of the underlying facts and circumstances to allow a neutral and detached magistrate to draw his own conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Id. at 506. Our supreme court concluded that “the affidavit falls far short of the constitutional standards required by the Fourth Amendment” because it “merely alleges that the appellant engaged in unlawful conduct.” Id. The court also held that the trial court had committed reversible error by admitting evidence seized when the warrant was served upon the defendant. Id.
We agree with Shotts that, like the affiant in Kinnaird, the Alabama affiant merely alleged that Shotts had committed a crime, in this case receiving, retaining, or disposing of stolen property. The affiant did not provide any facts from which a neutral magistrate could have drawn his own conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Thus, the arrest warrant is invalid pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Alternatively, the State argues that if the warrant is constitutionally invalid, then the “good faith exception” applies to save the evidence seized during Shotts’s arrest. . . . .
The State claims that because the Indiana officers executed the arrest warrant without actually seeing it, they cannot be charged with knowledge of any defects and thus must have acted in good faith. Our inquiry is not limited merely to the law enforcement officers who execute the warrant, however. Clearly, the Indiana officers in this case were acting in good faith, but what about the Alabama officer who obtained the warrant in the first place? [Footnote omitted.] There is no question that he knew or should have known that his testimony was insufficient to support a probable cause determination. Objectively speaking, the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in the warrant’s validity entirely unreasonable. To allow law enforcement to insulate the State from the operation of the exclusionary rule by simply creating one degree of separation between the officer acting in bad faith and the officer executing the warrant would serve no deterrent effect whatsoever. Thus, based upon this officer’s actions, the good faith exception does not apply in this case.
ROBB, J., and BROWN, J., concur.