BOEHM, J.
We hold that when a claimant seeks excess damages from the Patient’s Compensation Fund after obtaining a judgment or settlement from a health care provider in a medical malpractice case, the Fund may introduce evidence of the claimant’s preexisting risk of harm if it is relevant to establish the amount of damages, even if it is also relevant to liability issues that are foreclosed by the judgment or settlement.
. . . .
Under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, the total recovery in a medical malpractice action is limited to $1,250,000 per “injury or death.” The Act caps a health care provider’s mal-practice liability at $250,000 per occurrence if the provider maintains sufficient insurance and pays the required surcharge to the Patient’s Compensation Fund. Ind. Code §§ 34-18-3-1, -14-3(b) (2004). The Fund is financed by the surcharges collected from providers throughout the state and pays “excess damages.” Recovery of excess damages from the Fund is allowed only after a health care provider or the provider’s insurer has paid the first $250,000, id. § 34-18-15-3(1), or made a settlement in which the sum of the present cash payment and cost of future periodic payments exceeds $187,000. Id. § 34-18-14-4(b). Multiple providers’ cash payments and contributions to a periodic payments agreement are aggregated for purposes of the $187,000 requirement. Id. § 34-18-14-4(c). If the Fund and claimant cannot agree on the amount to be paid from the Fund, the court must hold a hearing to “determine the amount for which the fund is liable.” Id. § 34-18-15-3(4)-(5). In determining this amount, “the court shall consider the liability of the health care provider as admitted and established.” Id. § 34-18-15-3(5).
In this case, the Estate filed a petition to access the Fund after settling with the health care providers under an agreement in which the providers contributed a total of $187,001 in cash and payments to purchase an annuity. The Estate and the Fund dispute the meaning of the statutory provision that “liability” is to be treated as “established” by the settlement. The Estate argues that “liability” includes causation and the statute therefore precludes the Fund from introducing evidence related to causation issues. We understand the Estate’s contention to embrace both causation in fact and scope of liability, sometimes described as proximate cause. The Estate thus argues that any evidence of Herbst’s risk of death bears on causation-whether the death results from malpractice-and is therefore precluded. The Fund responds that its evidence is admissible because it is relevant to the amount of damages for which it is liable.
The Medical Malpractice Act does not define “liability.” However, the Act provides that undefined legal terms have the meaning consistent with the common law. I.C. § 34-18-2-2. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), liability is the “quality or state of being legally obligated or accountable.” To say that one is “liable” does not establish the amount of damages. In this case evidence of Herbst’s underlying risk of death whether or not he was properly treated is relevant to both liability-whether malpractice caused his death-and to damages-the amount for which the Fund is responsible. For this reason, it is admissible and its exclusion was error.
. . . .
In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and held that the Fund’s argu-ment and evidence were inadmissible. Atterholt v. Herbst, 879 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The Court of Appeals reasoned that evidence of increased risk of harm would be relevant to establishing causation under Mayhue, but was irrelevant where causation was established by settlement as it was in Glover. The Court of Appeals recognized the “potential for unjust outcomes” but concluded that this was not a problem because “[i]f a patient has only a small chance of survival . . . healthcare providers should not be overly eager to settle such claims.” Id.
We respectfully disagree with the Court of Appeals. Relevance is not an either-or proposition. Evidence of increased risk of harm can be relevant to both causation under Mayhue and valuation of damages. Here, the settlement between the Fund and the health care providers precluded consideration of causation, but left open the amount of damages. The trial court therefore correctly granted partial summary judgment restating the statute and the Glover holding, but erred in excluding the Fund’s evidence regarding Herbst’s risk of death before any malpractice.
Second, we disagree that providers’ resistance to settlement provides an adequate safe-guard against invasion of the Fund. On the contrary, a health care provider would presumably readily settle a case such as Herbst’s where there are potentially large damages. Even if, as the Fund argues, only ten percent of Herbst’s more than $2,500,000 damages were caused by negli-gence, a health care provider would face a judgment of at least $250,000 plus the substantial cost of defense. Even though liability is capped at $250,000, a provider has substantial incentive to settle for that amount, and even more to enter into a settlement for periodic payments costing $187,000.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.