NAJAM, J.
Young contends that the trial court erred when, in addition to the two-year suspension of his driver’s license under Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-10, the court ordered as a condition of his probation that he could not operate a motor vehicle. Young maintains that that is not a valid condition of probation under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-2.3. We cannot agree.
Young is correct that Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-10(d) provides that the trial court could only suspend his driver’s license for a maximum term of two years. But Young mischaracterizes the contested condition of probation. The trial court did not “suspend his driver’s license” for an additional term as a condition of his probation. Rather, the trial court imposed as a condition of his probation that Young could not operate a motor vehicle. The trial court expressly stated that Young was entitled to have his driver’s license reinstated at the end of the two-year suspension and that he could own a car. The trial court merely ordered that Young could not operate a motor vehicle. [Footnote omitted.]
As the State points out, Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-2.3(a)(14) provides that the trial court can order as a condition of probation that the defendant “[s]atisfy other conditions reasonably related to the person’s rehabilitation.” And this Court has held that a trial court has discretion to impose conditions of probation that are reasonably related to the treatment of the defendant and the protection of public safety. Stott v. State, 822 N.E.2d 176, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Here, given Young’s history of driving while intoxicated and his admission that he is in need of rehabilitative treatment for alcoholism, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed this challenged condition of probation.
BAKER, C.J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.