CRONE, J.
McReynolds lived in Yavonne Wasson’s home. In exchange for a place to stay, McReynolds agreed to babysit Wasson’s two children, ten-year-old A.R. and seven-year-old M.R., while she was at work. He also provided the children with transportation to and from school and helped them with homework. McReynolds generally asked Wasson’s permission before disciplining the children.
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. . . McReynolds decided to take M.R. to work with him. McReynolds told M.R. to get ready to leave and asked him if he needed to use the restroom. M.R. said no, and then subsequently wet his pants. McReynolds asked him why he lied, and M.R. said that “he didn’t know, he didn’t care.” Id. at 226. McReynolds used a belt and a wooden clothes hanger with metal prongs to spank M.R. at least five times. According to M.R., McReynolds spanked him because he lied.1 Id. at 49. Later, at Deaconess Cross Pointe, Wasson saw blood on the back of M.R.’s shirt, and when she pulled it up, she discovered severe bruising and bleeding on M.R.’s buttocks. An ambulance was called, and M.R. was transported to Deaconess Gateway Hospital. M.R. was treated with antibiotics and pain medication through intravenous therapy and remained in the hospital for at least two days. A week later, his injuries still required bandages.
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The Dayton [v. State, 501 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)] court observed that Dayton was not a parent or guardian and therefore turned to a consideration of whether he could be classified as a custodian. The Dayton court reasoned as follows:
The CHINS statute defines custodian as “a person with whom a child resides.” Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-1-2 (Burns Repl. 1980). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976), p. 559 broadens the definition to anyone “that guards and protects or maintains….” Thus, the spectrum within the custodian classification ranges from a parent at one end to a stranger who agrees to watch a baby or child while the parent is momentarily occupied at the other end. Unquestionably, the common law provides some custodians with the right to use reasonable corporal punishment in disciplining a child. However, just as certainly, the common law does not recognize the right in all custodians. Indeed, Dayton has failed to present us with any authority for the existence of the right in custodians other than parents, schoolteachers and persons in loco parentis. Further, he fails to make any argument for such an extension. . . . .
Thus, we learn from Dayton that some custodians have the right to use reasonable corporal punishment, but only those custodians who are persons in loco parentis. Id. In the context of determining whether a guardian was required to provide child support, our supreme court discussed the meaning of in loco parentis as follows:
In loco parentis means “in the place of a parent.” Black’s Law Dictionary 803 (8th ed. 2004). The doctrine refers to a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption. It embodies the two ideas of assuming the parental status and discharging the parental duties. This status results from intention and generally may be terminated at any time. Historically, in loco parentis has been deployed to protect schools and teachers from liability for restricting and disciplining their pupils. It has likewise served as a basis for the authority of juvenile courts. Snow v. England, 862 N.E.2d 664, 666 (Ind. 2007) (some citations and quotation marks omitted).
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. . . [O]ur review of the record leads us to conclude that McReynolds was not a person in loco parentis. McReynolds was neither a stepparent nor romantically involved with M.R.’s mother. He did not act as a father figure, nor did he have the responsibilities of a father or stepfather. He did not make parenting decisions on his own or even in conjunction with Wasson. McReynolds acknowledged that he “didn’t really ask questions” about Wasson’s parental decisions. Tr. at 229. In short, McReynolds was a babysitter. He drove the children to school and helped them with their homework. When necessary, he asked Wasson’s permission to discipline the children, although he did not do so on this occasion. At all times, McReynolds was subject to Wasson’s direction. Given the circumstances present here, we conclude that McReynolds was not a person in loco parentis, and therefore the parental privilege defense is not available to him.
Even if we were to conclude that McReynolds was entitled to assert the parental privilege defense, we would conclude that his use of force was unreasonable.
ROBB, J., and BROWN, J., concur.