DARDEN, J.
More relevant to our purposes here, Boss also challenged the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences as “multiple penalties for the same offense.” Id. at 785. We took note of the fact that the three counts in the 1996 charging information alleged that Boss’ non-support of his dependent children had occurred over three “contiguous” or successive periods over a very short period of time, and concluded that the prosecutor had “arbitrarily divide[d] the offenses into separate time periods in order to multiply the penalties.” Id. Accordingly, we held that Boss could, therefore, only be convicted and sentenced for one crime. Although Gilliam phrases his argument differently from Boss, his argument is essentially the same, namely, that his non-support of his eight dependent children constituted a single episode of criminal conduct. We cannot agree.
Simply stated, under the unique circumstances of this case, Gilliam’s offenses do not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct. In Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), we stated, in pertinent part, the following:
In determining whether multiple offenses constitute an episode of criminal conduct, the focus is on the timing of the offenses and the simultaneous and contemporaneous nature, if any, of the crimes. ‘[A]dditional guidance on the question’ can be obtained by considering ‘whether the alleged conduct was so closely related in time, place, and circumstance that a complete account of one charge cannot be related without referring to the details of the other charge.’
891 N.E.2d at 631 (internal citations omitted). The consecutive sentencing statute in effect at the time of the defendant’s crimes in Williams – and which is also applicable in the instant case – defined an “episode of criminal conduct” as “offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” Id. (citing Robertson v. State, 871 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ind. 2007)); I.C. § 35-50-1-2 (2002).
Gilliam appears to confuse the notion of a “continuous” obligation to pay child support with the concept of multiple events constituting a “single episode of conduct.” Boss, 702 N.E.2d at 784; Williams, 891 N.E.2d at 624. The facts herein reveal that when Gilliam failed, during the applicable periods between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2004, to pay court-ordered child support, three separate and distinct households (with different sets of victims) were deprived of support for dependent children.
. . . Based upon the foregoing facts, Gilliam has not demonstrated that his offenses constituted a single episode of criminal conduct. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences.
FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.
BARNES, J., concurs in result with separate opinion:
Instead of asking whether Gilliam’s crimes constituted a “single episode of criminal conduct” under Section 35-50-1-2(c) and cases interpreting that phrase, I believe it is sufficient to say that consecutive sentences were permissible and justified here because of the existence of multiple victims, i.e. three distinct family units, who were harmed by Gilliam’s failure to pay child support.