SHEPARD, C.J.
St. Clair faced a class C felony charge of sexual misconduct with a minor. On November 6, 2006, he pled guilty to a class D felony in exchange for the dismissals of the class C charge as well as four other charges then pending in other cases. The plea agreement read in part:
The State will recommend the following sentence:
[x] A fine in the amount of $1.00 plus applicable Court costs;
[x] A term of imprisonment of 3 years suspended, except for the following: 180 days. …
[x] A term of probation 2½ year(s), with the normal and usual terms of probation…
[x] other terms as follows: If Defendant successfully completes probation he may petition for reduction to Class A Misdemeanor.
(Appellant’s App. at 17.)
The trial court held three hearings — one to entertain the change of plea and advise St. Clair of his rights, one at which the parties discussed whether the conviction would mean St.
Clair would be obliged to register as a sex offender, and one at which the court imposed sentence. From the first of these hearings, the court, the defendant, and counsel appeared to anticipate if the court accepted the plea and approved the agreement, sentencing would be in accord with the agreement:
COURT: Mr. Hardy, would you state the agreement for the record, please? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, your Honor. My client will be pleading guilty to count two, sexual misconduct with a minor as a class D felony. The state will be dismissing count one and CM-891. He will receive a fine in the amount of one dollar plus court costs, a term of imprisonment of three years all of which will be suspended except for one hundred eighty days which will be served. There will be a term of probation of one and one half years. There will be an administrative and initial users fees of one hundred dollars, continued users fees of thirty dollars a month for twenty nine months. He will have no contact with the victim in this case. There will be a public defender fee. He will participate in all programs or counseling recommended by probation. That his bond will be forfeited to pay for fines and court costs and other monetary obligations and at the end of successful probation, he may petition for a reduction to a class A misdemeanor.
COURT: Mr. St. Clair, is that the agreement you believe you have?
DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. (Tr. at 17-18.)
The sentencing hearing consisted of the plea agreement’s terms and an explanation of what they meant. (Appellant’s App. at 17, 20; Tr. at 31-33.) None of the participants mentioned the existence of any judicial discretion to stray from the terms of the plea agreement. (Tr. at 31-33.) The court sentenced St. Clair exactly as the plea agreement provided. (Tr. at 31-33; Appellant’s App. at 17, 20-24.)
. . . .
St. Clair claims the trial court had the “broad discretion” to impose the recommended sentence, or a lesser sentence, or a harsher sentence within statutory and other legal limits. (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) St. Clair does not point to any substantial evidence that he, his lawyer, the prosecutor, or Judge Fee intended or understood this to be the case. [Footnote omitted.] His central argument that the parties intended an open agreement rests on the agreement’s use of the word “recommend.” (Id. at 11-12.) St. Clair says the State really made two recommendations: a recommendation that the court accept the agreement and a recommendation about sentence, both non-binding. (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5.)
St. Clair emphasizes the necessity that “recommend” must mean something that is non-binding. Because no plea agreement is binding until the trial court accepts it, his definition would cover both open and fixed agreements. Furthermore, this Court has heard numerous cases in which plea agreements are quoted or described as recommending a sentence that we treated as fixed agreements. See, e.g., Pannarale, 638 N.E.2d at 1248 (“Once it has accepted a plea agreement recommending a specific sentence, however, the terms of the agreement constrain the discretion the court would otherwise employ in sentencing.”). Accord, Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 43 (Ind. 2001); Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. 2001); Freije, 709 N.E.2d at 326; Reffett v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1227, 1227-28 (Ind. 1991). [Footnote omitted.]
Finally, the plea agreement fashioned by the parties uses “recommend” only in the sentencing section, which is also the only section that binds the State to act. (Appellant’s App. at 17.) The other two sections state the defendant “will plead guilty” and “waives” certain rights, such as the right to a direct appeal. (Id.) Using the phrase “will recommend” in this but not the other two sections thus makes sense. While it could be more explicit that the court has no discretion to alter the terms of the agreement – only to accept or reject it in its entirety – the normal use of the word “recommend” in Indiana plea bargaining clearly justifies its use here.
In this context, the parties clearly did not intend to present an open plea agreement to the court. The great weight of the evidence suggests that all the parties understood St. Clair’s agreement was one that specified a particular sentence if the court approved the agreement and accepted the plea.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.