NAJAM, J.
THE COURT: You have certain rights in the proceeding besides knowing what the charges are and what the possible penalties are. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. And you have a right for the Court to appoint an attorney if you do not have the means or your parents do not have the means to appoint one. What do you wish to do about an attorney? Do you wish to have an attorney at this time?
[R.W.]: No, ma’am.
THE COURT: Do you then wish to waive your right to an attorney?
[R.W.] Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: A child cannot waive the right to an attorney unless a parent agrees with that waiver . . . .
[MOTHER]: I agree.
THE COURT: So, is it your intention, [R.W.’s mother]?
[MOTHER]: Yes.
THE COURT: To join your son in agreeing to waive your right to an attorney?
[MOTHER]: Yes.
. . . .
R.W. contends that he was denied his right to counsel at the initial hearing because he was not given an opportunity to meaningfully consult with his mother about waiving that right. The State responds by identifying the portions of the record, quoted at length above, in which the trial court informed R.W. of the allegations against him and their possible penalties and in which R.W. and his mother repeatedly stated that R.W. did not want counsel. Despite that commentary, however, we must agree with R.W.
If R.W. were an adult, we would be inclined to agree with the State that R.W. knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. But that is not the case. R.W. is a juvenile, and the State must additionally demonstrate that he was given the opportunity to meaningfully consult with his mother before R.W. could waive his constitutional rights. See I.C. § 31-32-5-1; Cherrone, 726 N.E.2d at 254. The record is devoid of any evidence that the trial court provided R.W. with an opportunity to meaningfully consult with his mother about the waiver of his right to counsel before R.W. stated his desire to waive that right. Accepting the State’s argument on appeal would nullify the distinction between the requirements for a juvenile’s waiver of his or her fundamental rights and the requirements for an adult’s waiver of those rights.
The State cannot demonstrate either that R.W. actually consulted with his mother or was given the express opportunity for that consultation before informing the court that he did not want counsel. Again:
The meaningful consultation requirement will be met when the State demonstrates “actual consultation of a meaningful nature or . . . the express opportunity for such consultation, which is then forsaken in the presence of the proper authority by the juvenile, so long as the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waives his constitutional rights.”
Brown, 751 N.E.2d at 670 (quoting Williams, 433 N.E.2d at 772). In other cases, either an express, but declined, opportunity to consult or anywhere between fifteen and forty-five minutes of actual consulting time between parent and child has been held to be sufficient to satisfy the meaningful consultation requirement. See, e.g., Brown, 751 N.E.2d at 670 (“The police gave Defendant’s father fifteen to [twenty] minutes to consult with his son. . . . Under these facts, we hold that Defendant received a meaningful opportunity to consult with his father.”); Cherrone, 726 N.E.2d at 254 (“the waiver was executed after a forty-five minute family consultation.”); see also Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 147-48 (Ind. 1999) (“Trowbridge and Frost were given two opportunities for meaningful consultation. They declined the first offer and later chose not to consult when left alone in the interrogation room expressly for that purpose.”); Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 1997) (“They were given an opportunity to consult privately with each other immediately after the rights were read. They declined the opportunity to consult.”). Those circumstances did not occur here.
There is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that R.W. was given any opportunity to consult with his mother. Accordingly, the State has not met its “heavy burden” to demonstrate that R.W. satisfactorily waived his right to counsel. Cherrone, 726 N.E.2d at 254. Therefore, R.W.’s subsequent confession to the allegations against him at the initial hearing were not given in accordance with Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1, and we must reverse his adjudication. [Footnote omitted.]
BAKER, C.J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.