DARDEN, J.
On February 19, 2008, Kuhn filed a motion to set a hearing on his [pro se] petition for post-conviction relief and a motion for an order to produce (transport) him to the hearing. The post-conviction court ordered Kuhn to be notified of the March 20, 2008, hearing date, but denied his motion for a transport order. Kuhn was not present at the March 20, 2008, hearing. In Kuhn’s absence, the post-conviction court conducted a hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. After the State presented argument, the post-conviction court denied Kuhn’s petition. Kuhn now appeals.
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A petition for post-conviction relief may be summarily denied if the pleadings and the record conclusively demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Howard v. State, 576 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (Ind. 1991) (citing P-C.R. 1(4)(g)). “An evidentiary hearing is not necessary when the pleadings show only issues of law; [t]he need for a hearing is not avoided, however, when a determination of the issues hinges, in whole or in part, upon facts not resolved.” Godby v. State, 809 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Thus, a hearing is still needed even if the petitioner’s chance of establishing his claim is remote. Gann v. State, 550 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). The State cites Evolga v. State, 722 N.E.2d 370, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), for the proposition that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally raise issues of material fact and render summary disposition improper. In his petition for post-conviction relief, Kuhn alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he allegedly failed (1) to put forth a defense; (2) to advise him of a plea offer; (3) to interview two witnesses; (4) to cross-examine the State’s witnesses; and (5) to present evidence of mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase.
We find, and the State acknowledges, [footnote omitted] that the post-conviction court’s decision to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Kuhn’s ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims in Kuhn’s absence was error, and that Kuhn was entitled to an opportunity to present evidence to support his claims. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Kuhn’s petition for post-conviction relief and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent herewith.
RILEY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.