KIRSCH, J.
In its order granting Brown’s motion to suppress, the trial court balanced the totality of the circumstances as follows:
The Defendant had just arrived at the location where the party was being held. Marshall [sic] Frazee and Deputy Lennartz had already spoken to the individuals at the party regarding the complaint about the excessive noise and the matter had been resolved to the officers’ satisfaction. The officers were in the process of leaving the site of the party when the Defendant initially entered the private lane to the location where the party was being held. The complaint being responded to by Deputy Lennartz and Marshall [sic] Frazee had been resolved and the Defendant who was just arriving at the site of the party could not have been the subject of the original complaint. There has not been shown to be any real need for Deputy Lennartz to communicate with the Defendant and consequently his decision to request the Defendant to see his driver’s license was random in nature as opposed to being justified by the complaint which initially resulted in Deputy Lennartz going to the site of the party. Law enforcement needs should allow that when police officers have been requested as a part of their duties to interact with an individual, they should be free to verify that that person does not have known or suspected dangerous propensities. This goal can be accomplished by checking the person’s name against law enforcement records. Cochran v. State, 843 N.E.2d 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Given that the Defendant had not yet arrived at the party when the officers had informed the persons present at the party of the noise complaint, the Court does not find that there was any need to interact with the Defendant and thus no need to ascertain his identity. In addition the Indiana Court of Appeals noted in the Cochran case that there was no indication that the officer requested Cochran’s name and birth date for the specific purpose of establishing whether Cochran had a driver’s license. The Court, after considering the totality of the circumstances, does not find that Deputy Lennartz’s actions were reasonable as required by Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
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Appealing as it does from a negative judgment, the State must show that the trial court’s ruling on the suppression motion was contrary to law. Lucas, 859 N.E.2d at 1248. This court will reverse a negative judgment only when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court. Id. Here, Deputy Lennartz was one of four officers responding to a complaint of a loud party. Deputy Lennartz and Marshal Frazee discussed the complaint with the party organizers, requested that the noise be kept down, and the organizers immediately complied. Brown did not arrive on the scene until the officers had completed their duties and were preparing to leave. By his late arrival, Brown could not have been the subject of the initial complaint. The trial court concluded, “Given that the Defendant had not yet arrived at the party when the officers had informed the persons present at the party of the noise complaint, the Court does not find that there was any need to interact with the Defendant and thus no need to ascertain his identity.” . . .We agree. We cannot say that the State sustained its burden of proving that the suppression order was contrary to law.
BAKER, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.