DICKSON, J.
We grant transfer and hold (1) in the exercise of the appellate authority to review and revise criminal sentences, a court may decrease or increase the sentence; (2) the State may not by appeal or cross-appeal initiate a challenge to a sentence imposed by a trial court; and (3) if a defendant seeks appellate review and revision of a sentence, the State may respond and urge the imposition of a greater sentence without the necessity of proceeding by cross-appeal.
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Under the plain language of the Indiana Constitution, the Court is granted the ability to revise a sentence. The word “revise” is not synonymous with “decrease,” but rather refers to any change or alteration. With no specific prohibition against increasing a sentence on appeal appearing in the text of Section 4, and the history of the provision indicating that the framers chose to adopt the language of the 1962 ABA Model Judicial Article, which intended to emulate the British system, which at that time authorized the increase or decrease of criminal sentences on appeal, we hold that the appellate review and revise authority derived from Article 4 of the Indiana Constitution likewise includes the power to either reduce or increase a criminal sentence on appeal. [Footnote omitted.]
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The State’s authority to appeal a trial court’s sentencing determination is restricted by Indiana Appellate Rule 7(A), which provides:
A defendant in a Criminal Appeal may appeal the defendant’s sentence. The State may not initiate an appeal of a sentence, but may cross-appeal where provided by law. App. R. 7(A) (emphasis added). The State identifies no provision of law that authorizes it to challenge a sentence by cross-appeal under Appellate Rule 7(A).
The State’s cross-appeal asserts that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion and also seeks appellate revision on grounds that the sentencing is inappropriately lenient in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Although the State does not claim that the sentence is invalid as contrary to the trial court’s statutory sentencing authority, we observe that where a trial court fails to sentence a defendant in accordance with statutory requirements, the State may raise such a claim for the first time on appeal. Stephens v. State, 818 N.E.2d 936, 939-40 (Ind. 2004).
We conclude that the State may not by appeal or cross-appeal (a) initiate a challenge to a trial court’s criminal sentence that is within the court’s sentencing authority or (b) seek appellate review and revision of such sentence. When a defendant requests appellate review and revision of a criminal sentence pursuant to authority derived from Article 7, Sections 4 or 6 of the Indiana Constitution, however, the reviewing court is presented with the issue of whether to affirm, reduce, or increase the sentence. As to this issue, the perspectives of both the defendant and the State will be helpful. Thus, the State’s appellee’s brief, when responding to such a request for sentence review and revision from a defendant, may, if desired, present reasons supporting an increase in the sentence without the necessity of proceeding by cross-appeal. In the present case, however, the defendant does not seek appellate review and revision of his sentence, and thus the State is precluded from seeking an increase in this sentence.
SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, J., concur.
BOEHM, J., concurs and concurs in result with separate opinion, in which RUCKER, J., concurs in Part II:
I concur in Part I of the majority opinion and agree with the portion of Part II holding that the State is not authorized to challenge a sentence by cross-appeal. I also agree with the result reached by the majority, namely that McCullough’s sentence remains as entered by the trial court. I reach that result through a somewhat different path.
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It seems highly unlikely that in practice Indiana’s appellate courts will frequently exercise their power to increase a sentence. Although I agree we have had that power for thirty-six years, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has ever exercised it. We have tacitly, and without awareness of the British legacy Justice Dickson has outlined, followed our British cousins in foregoing upward revision of sentences. In my view we should forthrightly state that although we have that power, we have never exercised it and do not expect to exercise it in the future except in the most unusual case. This will leave defendants free to exercise their constitutional right to appeal without great concern for retribution, eliminate concern for ineffective assistance claims based on taking an appeal that backfired, and avoid the temptation for the State to disguise a sentencing argument in some other garb. [Rucker, J., concurs.]