May, J.,
“[A]lternatives like problem-solving courts . . . are invaluable tools for rehabilitating drug offenders and reducing recidivism. These courts address the unique needs of eligible offenders, often allowing them to remain in their communities while taking part in intensive treatment programs under direct court supervision.” Kellams v. State, 198 N.E.3d 375, 375-6 (Ind. 2022) (Rush, C.J., dissenting from denial of transfer). However, the non-adversarial nature of problem-solving courts – which involve informal cooperation between parties and the court – can create “tension with participants’ due process rights.” William G. Meyer (Ret.), The Drug Court Judicial Bench Book 163 (Nat. Drug Ct. Institute 2011). That tension is the focus of this appeal.
The Lawrence Circuit Court ordered C.A. (“Mother”) to participate in juvenile problem-solving court (“JPSC”) with her son, K.W., who had been adjudicated a delinquent. After Mother allegedly failed to comply with several of the JPSC’s orders, the JPSC ordered Mother to spend multiple weekends in jail and placed her on house arrest with electronic monitoring, and it entered those orders depriving her of her liberty without the State providing the process due to someone alleged to be in indirect contempt of court. Mother asks us to declare the JPSC’s orders violated her right to due process.
The State argues we should dismiss Mother’s appeal as moot because the JPSC removed Mother from house arrest, vacated its most recent order for Mother’s imprisonment, and appointed counsel to assist Mother with the formal petition for contempt that the State thereafter filed. We address Mother’s appeal on its merits under Indiana’s public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and hold:
(1) the statutes that created problem-solving courts did not give the JPSC the authority to deprive Mother of her liberty;
(2) the JPSC failed to provide the process due to someone alleged to have committed indirect contempt of court; and
(3) the JPSC failed to obtain knowing waiver of those due process rights.
As the JPSC neither obtained a valid waiver of Mother’s rights nor provided the process due to a person alleged to have committed indirect contempt of court, we reverse the JPSC’s orders placing Mother on house arrest and ordering her to spend time in jail.
….
Issue 1: Did the problem-solving statutes authorize the JPSC to deprive Mother of her liberty?
Mother argues Indiana Code section 33-23-16-14.5, which outlines the procedure a problem-solving court should follow to remove a participant from the program, did not authorize the problem-solving court to place Mother in jail. We agree.
As we noted above, a problem-solving court’s services are available “only to individuals over whom the court that established the problem solving court has jurisdiction.” Ind. Code § 33-23-16-12. Here, the court that established the problem-solving court was Lawrence County’s juvenile court. Juvenile courts, pursuant to the statutes that created them, cannot have jurisdiction over adults. See D.P. v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1210, 12 (Ind. 2020) (“the language of the jurisdictional statute, Indiana Code section 31-39-1-1(1), is clear: in delinquency proceedings, a juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction only if the alleged offender is a ‘child.’ . . . [T]he definition of a ‘child’ does not include individuals twenty-one or older, I.C .§ 31-9-2-13(d)[.]”). Thus, the JPSC did not have jurisdiction over Mother unless it obtained jurisdiction over her by some other process.
There are processes by which parents of juvenile delinquents can be ordered to “participate in a program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child.” Ind. Code § 31-37-12-6…. However, courts must follow specific statutory procedures for entering such decrees… A failure to follow the statutory procedure for ordering parental participation is itself a denial of due process.,, The record before us does not demonstrate such a petition was filed and adjudicated prior to Mother being ordered to participate in the JPSC.
If we assume that Mother was properly ordered to participate in the JPSC, the next question is whether the statutes defining problem-solving courts authorized the JPSC to place Mother in jail…
First, section 33-23-16-14.5 allows problem-solving courts to “remand the individual into custody” for an alleged violation of a condition of the participation agreement or case management plan. However, to “remand” a person into custody is to “send back” or return the person to custody to await further proceedings…
Moreover, looking at the remaining sections of chapter 16 indicates the statutes do not apply to Mother… Thus, Indiana Code section 33-23-16-14.5 could not have authorized the JPSC to deprive Mother of her liberty.
This does not mean that a problem-solving court is without the power to deprive the liberty of a parent who violates a court order while participating in a problem-solving court program with a child. It simply means the court must either: (a) follow the statutory procedures provided for holding a person in indirect contempt, or (b) obtain an adequate waiver of the rights at issue. Unfortunately, here, the JPSC did neither.
Issue 2: Did the JPSC comply with the statutes for indirect contempt?
….
… Thus, a court cannot punish a parent for indirect contempt of a court order without providing that parent with advance notice via a rule to show cause… The JPSC did not provide Mother with notice of the allegations against her before it deprived her of her liberty by imposing house arrest and incarceration, and thus we cannot hold the JPSC provided Mother the process she was due under the contempt statute.
Issue 3: Did the JPSC obtain a valid waiver of Mother’s rights?
….
Mother arrived in the problem-solving court because her son was adjudicated a delinquent child. When Mother, Grandmother, and K.W. were ordered to enter the JPSC, a document entitled “Terms and Conditions of Participation in the [JPSC]” was signed. (App. Vol. 2 at 47.) Grandmother was K.W.’s legal guardian and her signature legibly appears in the form in one of the lines for a “Parent/Guardian” to sign. (Id. at 49.) K.W. signed on both a “Participant” line and the second “Parent/Guardian” line. A signature that could be Mother’s appears on the line for “Counsel”, but that signature is not similar to the way Mother signed her name on the three other documents in the record that contain her signature. (Compare id. at 49 with id. at 91, 92, & 97.) Accordingly, we are not certain that Mother signed the Terms and Conditions of Participation in the JPSC, such that she could have thereby waived her right to due process prior to being held in contempt.
….
While we acknowledge that citizens “may waive [their] right to procedural due process,” Gosha v. State, 931 N.E.2d 432, 434-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), the inadequacies of the participation agreement provided by the JPSC, in addition to the open question of whether Mother even signed that form, lead us to conclude we simply cannot hold that Mother waived her right to formal contempt proceedings herein.
….
Conclusion
We address whether the JPSC had the authority to deprive Mother of her liberty without notice and a formal hearing under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine because it has not been addressed, it is complicated, and it is likely to recur as problem-solving courts proliferate. The statutes defining problem-solving courts do not give the JPSC the authority to deprive Mother of her liberty without following statutory process for holding Mother in indirect contempt of court. While Mother could have waived her right to due process prior to deprivation of her liberty, the record before us does not demonstrate Mother knowingly waived her rights. Accordingly, we reverse the JPSC’s orders placing Mother on house arrest and ordering her to serve time in jail.
Reversed.
Vaidik, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.